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CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES 
 
 Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants makes the following certificate pursuant to 
D.C. Circuit Rule 28(a): 
A. Parties, amici, and intervenors 
The following list includes all parties who appeared in the district court and 
who appear in this Court: 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
 
Margaret Peggy Lee Mead 
(no longer a party to this appeal) 
 
Charles Edward Lee 
 
Susan Seven-Sky 
 
Kenneth Ruffo 
 
Gina Rodriguez 
 
 
 
Defendants-Appellees 
 
Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General of 
the United States, in his official capacity 
 
United States Department of Health and 
Human Services 
 
Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the 
United States Department of Health and 
Human Services, in her official capacity 
 
United States Department of the 
Treasury 
 
Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary of the 
United States Department of the 
Treasury, in his official capacity 
 
 No amici or intervenor appeared in the district court proceedings.  Mountain 
States Legal Foundation and Judicial Watch, Inc., have indicated their intention to 
participate as amici curiae before this Court. 
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B. Rulings Under Review 
 Plaintiffs-Appellants are appealing from the final decision and supporting 
memorandum opinion of District Judge Gladys Kessler entered on February 22, 
2011, granting Defendants-Appellees’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint.  
JA 101-66.  The memorandum opinion appears on Lexis with the following 
citation:  Mead v. Holder, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011).   
C. Related Cases 
 This case was never previously before this Court, or any other court, other 
than the district court from which this case has been appealed.  Plaintiffs-
Appellants are not aware of any cases pending in this Court that involve the same 
parties or substantially the same issues or any such cases previously before this 
Court.  Plaintiffs-Appellants provide the following list of cases, of which they are 
aware, that involve substantially the same or similar issue(s) as this appeal and that 
are currently pending before other federal courts: 
Court Name Case Name Docket Number 
 
U.S. District Court 
for the District of 
Columbia 
 
Association of American 
Physicians & Surgeons 
v. 
Sebelius 
 
1:10-cv-499-RJL 
 
U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit 
 
Virginia 
v. 
Sebelius 
 
11-1057 & 11-1058
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U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit 
Liberty University 
v. 
Geithner 
10-2347 
 
U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit 
 
TMLC 
v. 
Obama 
 
10-2388 
 
U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit 
 
 
U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit 
 
 
U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit 
 
 
U.S. Citizens Association 
v. 
Obama 
 
Kinder 
v. 
Department of Treasury 
 
Florida 
v. 
U.S. Department of Health 
& Human Services 
 
11-3327 
 
 
 
11-1973  
 
 
 
11-11021 &  
11-11067 
 
U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District 
of Oklahoma 
 
Oklahoma 
v. 
Sebelius 
 
6:11-cv-30-RAW 
 
U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District 
of Ohio 
 
U.S. Citizen Association 
v. 
Obama 
 
5:10-cv-1065-DDD
 
U.S. District Court 
for the Middle District 
of Pennsylvania 
 
Goudy-Bachman 
v. 
U.S. Department of Health 
& Human Services 
 
1:10-cv-763-CCC 
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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
 
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1 and D.C. Circuit Rule 26.1, counsel for 
Plaintiffs-Appellants certifies that there are no non-governmental corporate parties 
to these proceedings. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
 
This case involves a facial challenge to Section 1501 of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”)1/, which requires most Americans, 
including Plaintiffs, to buy and indefinitely maintain approved health insurance or 
pay annual penalties (also known as the individual mandate), and arises under the 
United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., and 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202.  The district court had original jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ 
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1346.  This Court has jurisdiction over 
this appeal from a final decision of the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 The district court entered a final decision dismissing all of Plaintiffs’ claims 
with prejudice on February 22, 2011.  JA 101-02.  The order states: “[t]his is a 
final appealable Order subject to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.”  JA 102.  
Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal on February 25, 2011.  JA 167-68; Fed. R. 
App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). 
                                                 
 1/ 111 Pub. L. No. 148, 124 Stat. 119, 111th Cong., 2d Sess., Mar. 23, 2010, 
as amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (“HCERA”), 111 
Pub. L. No. 152, 124 Stat. 1029, 111th Cong., 2d Sess., Mar. 30, 2010.  Section 
1501 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091 and 26 U.S.C. § 5000A.  The most relevant 
sections of these statutes are provided in the Addendum and at JA 55-78. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether the PPACA’s individual mandate, which requires most 
Americans to buy and indefinitely maintain approved health insurance or pay 
annual penalties, is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s authority under 
the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses of Article I of the United States 
Constitution. 
II. Whether, as a matter of first impression, the power “[t]o regulate 
commerce . . . among the several States,” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, empowers 
Congress to regulate the “mental activity” of Americans (e.g., the decision not to 
enter the market for health insurance), as the district court so concluded, and 
require those individuals who have declined to purchase health insurance to buy 
and indefinitely maintain health insurance or pay annual penalties. 
III. Whether requiring Plaintiffs Seven-Sky and Lee to either indefinitely 
maintain health insurance or pay annual penalties violates their rights under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE 
 Section 1501 requires Plaintiffs and many other lawful United States 
residents to buy and indefinitely maintain health insurance under the threat of 
annual financial penalties.  The section begins with a series of findings that focus 
exclusively upon the purported Commerce Clause authority to impose the 
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“individual responsibility requirement,” that is, the requirement that every person 
buy and indefinitely maintain health insurance.  § 1501(a), as amended by § 
10106(a); JA 47-48, 56-58, 64-66.  The first substantive provision of Section 1501 
is the individual mandate, which states that “[a]n applicable individual shall for 
each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of 
the individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential 
coverage for such month.”  § 1501(b), at § 5000A(a); JA 44-45, 58. 
 Under the heading of “shared responsibility payment,” a separate subsection 
of Section 1501 imposes a “penalty” upon a taxpayer for each applicable 
individual within his or her household who lacks health insurance coverage.  § 
1501(b), at § 5000A(b)(1), as amended by § 10106(b)(1); JA 45, 58, 66.  The 
“administration and procedure” subsection of Section 1501 creates “special rules” 
to ensure that key traditional methods of tax enforcement are not available to 
collect the individual mandate penalty.  § 1501(b), at § 5000A(g); JA 47, 63.  
Section 1501 sets a “flat dollar amount” of the penalty per uninsured person per 
year—$95 in 2014, $325 in 2015, $695 in 2016 and later years (increased in 2017 
and later years in relation to cost-of-living adjustments)—although the amount 
may be raised or lowered in certain circumstances.  § 1501(b), at § 5000A(c), as 
amended by § 10106(b)(2), (3), and as amended by HCERA § 1002; JA 46-47, 58-
60, 66-67, 76-77.  
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Section 1501 excludes certain persons from the definition of “applicable 
individual” and provides a few exemptions.  § 1501(b), at § 5000A(d), (e), as 
amended by § 10106(c), (d), and as amended by HCERA § 1002(b); JA 45, 60-62, 
67, 76-77.  None of these provisions excuse Plaintiffs from having to comply with 
the individual mandate.  See id.  Also, the PPACA does not include a severability 
provision. 
 Plaintiffs are United States citizens who do not currently have health 
insurance and do not want or need such insurance.  JA 48-50.  It is highly likely 
that each Plaintiff will be required to either buy and indefinitely maintain health 
insurance or pay annual penalties beginning in 2014.  JA 49.  For example, it is 
highly likely that Plaintiff Rodriguez will be required to pay, at a minimum, 
$11,685 in penalties on behalf of herself and her household through 2020.  JA 51.  
As a direct result of the individual mandate’s inevitable impact upon Plaintiffs’ 
finances and lifestyle, they are compelled to adjust their finances now, by setting 
aside money, and will continue to do so to pay the annual penalties.  JA 50-52.  As 
a result, Plaintiffs will be unable to use or set aside that money for other purposes 
now, directly limiting their ability to plan for the future prudently.  Id. 
 Plaintiffs alleged in their Amended Complaint that Section 1501 is 
unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s power under Article I of the United 
States Constitution, and that the entire PPACA is invalid because Section 1501 is 
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not severable.  JA 33-36, 38, 42.  Plaintiffs Seven-Sky and Lee also alleged that the 
individual mandate violates their rights protected by RFRA.  JA 37-38.  The 
district court held that Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims, which are ripe 
for review, because they have alleged a substantial probability that they will be 
subject to the individual mandate in 2014 and beyond, which directly impacts their 
present spending and financial planning.2/  JA 115-27.  Defendants waived their 
jurisdictional arguments in a notice filed with the district court.  JA 98. 
 Regarding the merits, the district court concluded that the individual 
mandate was a valid exercise of the powers to regulate commerce and to make 
laws necessary and proper to the exercise of the commerce power based primarily 
upon four determinations: 1) Congress can regulate an individual’s “mental 
activity” of deciding not to buy health insurance, which substantially affects 
interstate commerce; 2) inevitably, all individuals will take part in the health care 
market, which Congress can regulate; 3) some uninsured individuals will receive 
health care services that they cannot pay for, the costs of which are shifted to 
others; and 4) the individual mandate is necessary to prevent the PPACA’s other 
sections from causing negative consequences.  JA 140-57.  The court also held, 
however, that the taxing power does not authorize Section 1501 because “Congress 
                                                 
2/ The district court concluded that Plaintiff Mead lacked standing because 
she would likely be covered under Medicare, JA 115-17, but Mead is not a party to 
this appeal. 
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did not intend the mandatory payment . . . to act as a revenue-raising tax, but rather 
as a punitive measure.”  JA 159.   
In addition, the court rejected the RFRA claims, holding that the ability to 
pay annual penalties in lieu of maintaining health insurance negates the existence 
of any substantial burden upon Plaintiff Seven-Sky and Lee’s religious exercise, 
and also holding that the individual mandate was the least restrictive means of 
achieving the compelling government interests of safeguarding public health and 
increasing health insurance coverage.  JA 163-66.  This timely appeal by Plaintiffs 
followed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 The individual mandate is unconstitutional because it exceeds even the 
outermost bounds of Congress’s Article I authority and is inconsistent with the 
constitutional system of dual sovereignty that divides power between the federal 
and State governments.  Under the Commerce Clause, Congress cannot “regulate” 
inactivity by requiring individuals to buy a good or service as a condition of their 
lawful residence in the United States, and Congress does not have carte blanche to 
include unconstitutional provisions within a larger scheme of commercial 
regulation.  Although Congress may regulate local economic activity that, when 
coupled with similar activity, substantially affects interstate commerce, it cannot 
regulate an entire group (uninsured individuals) because a small subset of that 
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group will, at some point in the future, engage in a class of economic activities 
within Congress’s power to regulate (receiving health care without paying for it). 
In addition, that virtually all Americans will participate in broadly defined 
markets at some point during their lifetimes (health care, housing, transportation, 
food, etc.) does not authorize Congress to regulate all Americans indefinitely 
without any connection to a specific, voluntary commercial or economic activity.  
The power to regulate an interstate market extends to those who voluntarily enter it 
during the duration of their participation in that market; that power does not 
authorize Congress to regulate non-participating individuals now based upon 
speculation about what they may do in the future.   
The novel arguments offered in support of the individual mandate are not 
subject to any meaningful limiting principle and, if accepted, would eviscerate the 
Constitution’s system of dual sovereignty and limited, enumerated federal powers. 
 Similarly, the Necessary and Proper Clause, often resorted to as “the last, 
best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action,” Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997), does not support the individual mandate.  A 
principal justification offered for the individual mandate is the need to avoid 
numerous negative consequences that the PPACA’s other provisions would cause 
absent the mandate to buy insurance.  Accepting this reasoning would transform 
the Necessary and Proper Clause from a modest means of carrying out the 
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enforcement of federal laws tied to an enumerated power into an unwieldy vehicle 
for Congress to pass statutes containing provisions that would have negative 
effects coupled with otherwise unconstitutional provisions to mitigate those 
negative effects. 
 Moreover, the claim that the individual mandate is necessary to achieve a 
goal within Congress’s authority is merely the beginning of the inquiry, not the 
end; to be valid the law must also be proper—“appropriate” and “consist[ent] with 
the letter and spirit of the constitution.”  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).  Given the wide-ranging implications of the arguments 
offered in support of the individual mandate for our system of dual sovereignty, the 
fact that the Commerce Clause does not authorize the individual mandate 
demonstrates that the mandate also exceeds the scope of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. 
 Furthermore, the individual mandate violates RFRA as applied to Plaintiffs 
Seven-Sky and Lee.  The Amended Complaint sets forth a plausible claim that the 
individual mandate substantially burdens their religious exercise by requiring them 
to either indefinitely maintain health insurance, which they sincerely believe would 
violate their religious belief that God will protect them from illness or injury, or 
pay annual penalties for declining to violate their faith.  Defendants, moreover, 
cannot meet their burden of demonstrating that applying the individual mandate to 
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Seven-Sky and Lee is the least restrictive means of furthering any compelling 
government interest. 
ARGUMENT 
 
I. THE PPACA’S INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.  
IT EXCEEDS CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY UNDER ARTICLE I OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
 
 “The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.  See 
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8.  As James Madison wrote, ‘the powers delegated by the 
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.  Those 
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.’”  
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (quoting The Federalist No. 45).  
The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of dual sovereignty, observing 
that “the Constitution protects us from our own best intentions:  It divides power 
among sovereigns and among branches of government precisely so that we may 
resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution 
to the crisis of the day.”  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187 (1992); see 
also U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery.  The Framers split the 
atom of sovereignty.  It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have 
two political capacities, one State and one federal, each protected from incursion 
by the other.”). 
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 The individual mandate exceeds the few and defined powers of Congress, 
including those provided by the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses.  It 
is, therefore, unconstitutional.   
Review of the district court’s dismissal of the constitutional claims under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is de novo.  Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 676 
(D.C. Cir. 2008). 
A. The individual mandate is not authorized by the Commerce 
Clause. 
 
 Congress has the power “[t]o regulate commerce . . . among the several 
States.”  U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8.  Although the scope of this power has been 
broadened from the original understanding of a power to “prescribe the rule by 
which commerce is to be governed,” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 
(1824), the Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress’s exercise of this 
power is limited. 
 Although federal statutes are presumed to be constitutional, United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000), the unprecedented nature of the individual 
mandate is strong evidence that the Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress 
to require an individual to buy something.  In Printz, the Supreme Court observed 
that “[t]he utter lack of statutes imposing obligations on the States’ executive 
(notwithstanding the attractiveness of that course to Congress), suggests an 
assumed absence of such power.”  521 U.S. at 907-08; see also id. at 905 (“if . . . 
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earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive power, we would have 
reason to believe that the power was thought not to exist.”); id. at 918 (finding 
significant the “almost two centuries of apparent congressional avoidance of the 
practice.”); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 
3138, 3159 (2010) (agreeing that “[p]erhaps the most telling indication of the 
severe constitutional problem with the PCAOB is the lack of historical precedent 
for this entity.”). 
 Similarly, the individual mandate “forge[s] new ground and extends the 
Commerce Clause powers beyond its current high water mark.”  Virginia v. 
Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 775 (E.D. Va. 2010).  “Never before has Congress 
required that everyone buy a product from a private company (essentially for life) 
just for being alive and residing in the United States.”  Florida v. U.S. Dep’t 
Health & Human Servs., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *71-72 (N.D. Fla. 2011).  
For the reasons set forth below, the individual mandate exceeds the outer bounds 
of the Commerce Clause. 
1. Lopez and Morrison emphasize that Congress may regulate 
voluntary economic activity, but the individual mandate 
regulates a person’s inactivity. 
 
 The individual mandate applies to all individuals lawfully present in the 
United States who have not been given an exemption.  The requirement to buy and 
indefinitely maintain health insurance, or indefinitely pay annual penalties, is not 
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triggered by the occurrence of any event or activity.  As one district court noted in 
another case involving the PPACA, “[t]he threshold question . . . is whether 
activity is required before Congress can exercise its power under the Commerce 
Clause.”  Id. at *74.  Another district court accurately observed that “[n]either the 
Supreme Court nor any federal circuit court of appeals has extended Commerce 
Clause powers to compel an individual to involuntarily enter the stream of 
commerce by purchasing a commodity in the private market.”  Virginia, 728 F. 
Supp. 2d at 782. 
A purported exercise of the Commerce Clause power must be predicated 
upon the regulation of existing, voluntary commercial or economic activity to be 
valid—not the failure to purchase a product.  Because the individual mandate 
applies to individuals regardless of whether they are presently engaged in any 
specific commercial or economic activity, it exceeds the Commerce Clause power.  
As such, the district court erred in holding that the individual mandate regulates 
“an economic activity:  deciding whether or not to purchase health insurance.”  JA 
140-41. 
District courts considering challenges to the individual mandate have 
recognized that prior cases upholding regulation under the Commerce Clause have 
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involved existing physical economic activity.3/  The fact that Supreme Court cases 
upholding statutes based on the Commerce Clause have all involved the regulation 
of existing commercial or economic activities is not a mere coincidence.  Lopez 
and Morrison illustrate that the requirement of voluntary commercial or economic 
activity is derived from the Commerce Clause’s text and history as well as the 
important constitutional principle of dual sovereignty. 
a. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
 In Lopez, the Supreme Court held that the Gun Free School Zones Act, 
which prohibited the possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school, 
exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority because it was a law that “ha[d] 
nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however 
broadly one might define those terms.”  514 U.S. at 561.  The Lopez Court 
reiterated that the Commerce Clause “‘must be considered in the light of our dual 
system of government and may not be extended so as to . . . effectually obliterate 
the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely 
centralized government.’”  Id. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)). 
                                                 
3/ See, e.g, JA 147 (“previous Commerce Clause cases have all involved 
physical activity, as opposed to mental activity, i.e., decision-making”); TMLC v. 
Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107416, at *23 (E.D. Mich. 
2010); Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *74-75; Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d 
at 771. 
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The Court identified three “categories of activity” that the Commerce Clause 
authorizes Congress to regulate, including “activities . . . that substantially affect 
interstate commerce,” the only category relevant here.  Id. at 558-59.  The Court 
summarized previous cases dealing with this category as holding that, “[w]here 
economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating 
that activity will be sustained.”  Id. at 560 (emphasis added).  The Court concluded 
that the Act exceeded Congress’s authority because possessing a gun in a school 
zone was not economic activity, nor was the Act “an essential part of a larger 
regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut 
unless the intrastate activity were regulated.”  Id. at 561. 
 The government argued that Congress may regulate non-economic activity 
(possessing guns in a school zone) that, in the aggregate, substantially affects 
interstate commerce.  Of note, the government cited the cost-shifting impact on the 
insurance system, arguing that gun possession may lead to violent crime, and “the 
costs of violent crime are substantial, and, through the mechanism of insurance, 
those costs are spread throughout the population.”  Id. at 563-64.  In rejecting these 
arguments, the Court responded by stating: 
We pause to consider the implications of the Government’s 
arguments.  The Government admits . . . that Congress could regulate 
not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent 
crime . . . . [as well as] any activity that it found was related to the 
economic productivity of individual citizens: family law (including 
marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example. . . .  Under the 
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theories that the Government presents . . . it is difficult to perceive any 
limitation on federal power. . . .  Thus, if we were to accept the 
Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by 
an individual that Congress is without power to regulate. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 The Court noted that the Constitution “withhold[s] from Congress a plenary 
police power that would authorize enactment of every type of legislation,” id. at 
566, and stated, 
[t]o uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would have to pile 
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general 
police power of the sort retained by the States. . . .  [That] would 
require us to conclude that the Constitution’s enumeration of powers 
does not presuppose something not enumerated, . . . and that there 
never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is 
truly local.  This we are unwilling to do. 
 
Id. at 567-68 (citations omitted); see also id. at 577-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(noting the importance of federalism principles in Commerce Clause 
interpretation). 
 The individual mandate does not withstand scrutiny under Lopez.  Being 
lawfully present within the United States, like possessing a gun within 1,000 feet 
of a school, is not a commercial or economic activity that substantially affects 
interstate commerce.  No support exists for the assertion that the power to 
“‘prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed’” includes the power to 
force those who do not want to engage in a commercial or economic activity to do 
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so.  See id. at 553 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196).  As in Lopez, “[t]o uphold the 
Government’s contentions here [would require] . . . convert[ing] congressional 
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained 
by the States.”  Id. at 567. 
b. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
 Morrison also demonstrates that the individual mandate exceeds Congress’s 
power.  There, the Court held that Section 13981 of the Violence Against Women 
Act, which provided a civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence, was 
unconstitutional because “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any 
sense of the phrase, economic activity.”  529 U.S. at 613.  Congress found that 
gender-motivated violence substantially affects interstate commerce, id. at 615, but 
the Court rejected the argument “that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent 
criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate 
commerce.”  Id. at 617-18.  The Court observed that cases in which it had upheld 
an assertion of Commerce Clause authority due to the regulated activity’s 
substantial effect on interstate commerce involved the regulation of “commerce,” 
an “economic enterprise,” “economic activity,” or “some sort of economic 
endeavor.”  Id. at 610-11. 
 Like Lopez, Morrison further illustrates that the individual mandate exceeds 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.  Accepting the government’s arguments 
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would lead to a federal police power allowing Congress—for the first time—to 
mandate a host of purchases by individuals. 
 After Morrison was decided, this Court upheld the application of the 
Endangered Species Act to a proposed housing development that would jeopardize 
the existence of the arroyo southwestern toad.  The Court reaffirmed the necessity 
of examining whether the regulation targets economic activity, stating that “[t]he 
first Lopez factor is whether the regulated activity has anything ‘to do with 
‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define 
those terms.’”  Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).  This Court declined to decide whether the 
absence of economic activity would be dispositive, or merely one factor to 
consider, because the construction of a housing development was an economic 
activity.  Id. at 1072. 
Rancho Viejo reaffirms that whether the regulated activity is economic in 
nature is at least one factor to consider,4/ casting doubt upon dicta from D.C. 
Circuit cases decided before Morrison suggesting that the Commerce Clause 
                                                 
4/ See also Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1158, 1160 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003) (opinions of Chief Judge Sentelle and now-current Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Roberts dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, noting that the 
majority’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause was more expansive than the 
Supreme Court’s). 
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allows Congress to regulate non-economic activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.5/   
The individual mandate is unconstitutional because it does not regulate 
voluntary economic activity; declining to enter a commercial transaction is not the 
equivalent of entering a commercial transaction. 
c. The individual mandate exceeds the Commerce 
Clause power because it does not regulate existing 
commercial or economic activity. 
 
 Through the individual mandate, Congress sought to obscure entirely the 
distinction between activity and inactivity, stating that Section 1501 “regulates 
activity that is commercial and economic in nature:  economic and financial 
decisions about how and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is 
purchased.”  § 1501(a)(2)(A), as amended by § 10106(a); JA 64 (emphasis added).  
Put differently, Congress asserted that being lawfully present in the United States 
without health insurance is itself economic activity that Congress can regulate.  The 
district court accepted this argument, stating: 
                                                 
5/ Navegar v. United States, 192 F.3d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (upholding a 
statute prohibiting the manufacture, transfer, and possession of semi-automatic 
assault weapons); Nat’l Assoc. of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (upholding the application of the Endangered Species Act to the 
construction of a hospital); Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(upholding the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act’s prohibition of 
activities preventing access to abortion clinics). 
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this Court finds the distinction [between regulating activity and 
inactivity], which Plaintiffs rely on heavily, to be of little significance.  
It is pure semantics to argue that an individual who makes a choice to 
forgo health insurance is not “acting,” especially given the serious 
economic and health-related consequences to every individual of that 
choice.  Making a choice is an affirmative action, whether one decides 
to do something or not do something.  They are two sides of the same 
coin.  To pretend otherwise is to ignore reality. 
 
JA 147.  In other words, deciding not to buy something is “mental activity” that 
Congress can regulate.  Id.  The district court incorporated this reasoning into its 
legal analysis, asking “whether the decision not to purchase health insurance is an 
‘economic’ one, like the activities in Wickard and Gonzales, or a ‘non-economic’ 
one like those in Lopez and Morrison.”  JA 137 (emphasis added). 
 The district court’s conclusion that “[i]t is pure semantics” to differentiate 
between actual economic conduct and the failure to buy a product is flawed for 
several reasons.  See JA 147.  First, 
“economic decisions” are a much broader and far-reaching category 
than are “activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” . . .  
Every person throughout the course of his or her life makes hundreds 
or even thousands of life decisions that involve the same general sort 
of thought process that the defendants maintain is “economic 
activity.”  There will be no stopping point if that should be deemed 
the equivalent of activity for Commerce Clause purposes. 
 
Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *102.  Some decisions lead to economic 
activity within Congress’s power to regulate, while many more decisions lead to 
non-economic activity, or inactivity, that is not within Congress’s power to 
regulate. 
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American adults decide daily whether to spend money on an array of goods 
and services.  A person may choose to buy X and not Y.  Under the district court’s 
reasoning, so long as Congress has the authority to regulate the interstate market 
for Y (which is often the case), it can mandate that all individuals purchase Y.  
Congress would merely need to assert that the “mental activity” of deciding not to 
purchase Y is economic in nature, and that the failure to buy Y substantially affects 
interstate commerce.  For example, Congress could cite its authority to regulate 
banking to justify a mandate that all individuals maintain a certain amount of 
money in a bank account or pay a penalty.  In short, the government’s defense of 
the individual mandate, which was adopted by the district court, “rests on a twisted 
revision of Descartes’ syllogism: ‘I think (about commerce), therefore I am 
(engaging in commerce).’”  Brief for Revere America Foundation as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at 30, Liberty University v. Geithner, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 125922 (W.D. Va. 2010) (No. 6:10-cv-00015-nkm). 
 Second, the district court cited “serious economic and health-related 
consequences to every individual” resulting from a failure to buy health insurance 
as a justification for Congress to mandate the purchase of health insurance.  JA 
147.  Any failure to purchase something will have consequences for both the 
person declining to make the purchase and those who are voluntary market 
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participants, yet that is a woefully inadequate (and unprecedented) basis for 
Congressional regulation. 
There is quite literally no decision that, in the natural course of events, 
does not have an economic impact of some sort.  The decisions of 
whether and when (or not) to buy a house, a car, a television, a dinner, 
or even a morning cup of coffee also have a financial impact that—
when aggregated with similar economic decisions—affect the price of 
that particular product or service and have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce. 
 
Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *98.  In addition, addressing the 
perceived “health-related consequences” of an individual’s actions is particularly 
within the purview of the States’ police powers, not Congress’s power. 
 Third, although at times a person’s failure to buy a particular product is the 
result of a deliberate decision-making process, far more often, the individual has 
not contemplated buying the particular product at all.  There is a vast and diverse 
array of services and products available for sale, many of which an individual will 
never make an active decision not to purchase.  As has been observed, “it is ‘a 
remarkable exaggeration of [the] rational aspects of human nature’ to claim that 
the uninsured (as a rule) make structured and calculated decisions to forego 
insurance . . . as opposed to simply not having it.”  Id. at *96-97.  The progression 
from a Congressional power to regulate commerce among the several States to a 
power to regulate a person’s failure to buy a good or service, even one that the 
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person has never thought about, is staggering, and bears no connection to the 
Commerce Clause’s text or the Constitution’s system of dual sovereignty. 
 In light of these principles, federal judges in Florida and Virginia have 
correctly held that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate ongoing 
commercial or economic activity in some circumstances, not mere “mental 
activity” or decisions.  “If some type of already-existing activity or undertaking 
were not considered to be a prerequisite to the exercise of commerce power, we 
would go beyond the concern articulated in Lopez for it would be virtually 
impossible to posit anything that Congress would be without power to regulate.”  
Id. at *80; accord Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 781.  These judges also rightly 
concluded that the individual mandate is ultra vires because it does not regulate 
existing commercial or economic activity.  Id. 
2. Wickard and Raich do not suggest that Congress’s authority 
to regulate local economic activity, as an essential part of a 
national scheme to regulate that activity, gives rise to a 
newly-minted power to force unwilling individuals into a 
market. 
 
 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 
(2005), stand for the proposition that federal regulation of a particular type of 
existing economic activity, such as producing a marketable commodity, can reach 
that activity at a purely local level when doing so is necessary and proper to 
effectively regulating that activity nationally.  Neither Wickard nor Raich suggests 
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that Congress may compel people to join a market involuntarily as an “essential” 
part of a scheme to regulate that market. 
a. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) 
 
 In Wickard, the Supreme Court upheld provisions of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act that authorized a penalty to be imposed on farmers who grew more 
wheat than the quotas set for their farms as a means of limiting supply and 
stabilizing market prices.  317 U.S. at 115-16.  Roscoe Filburn grew more than 
twice the quota for his farm; he typically sold a portion of his wheat in the 
marketplace, used a portion for feeding his livestock and for home consumption, 
and kept the rest for future use.  Id. at 114-15.  Filburn argued that the Act 
exceeded Congress’s power because his activities were local and had only an 
indirect effect upon interstate commerce.  Id. at 119. 
The Court upheld the Act, stating that “even if appellee’s activity be local 
and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, 
be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate 
commerce.”  Id. at 125.  The Court observed that the statute effectively 
“restrict[ed] the amount [of wheat] which may be produced for market and the 
extent as well to which one may forestall resort to the market by producing to meet 
his own needs.”  Id. at 127.   
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Wickard does not suggest that Congress may regulate inactivity that has 
some impact upon interstate commerce; rather, the Court held that Congress may 
regulate local economic activity (growing a marketable commodity) when that 
economic activity, taken in the aggregate with similar economic activity, 
substantially effects interstate commerce. 
 The district court incorrectly relied upon Wickard for the proposition that 
Congress may regulate those who decline to enter a market.  JA 142.  The law at 
issue in Wickard penalized overproduction of wheat, a quintessential voluntary 
economic activity, not the failure to make a purchase in the wheat market.  Wickard 
did not hold that Congress could have dealt with the issue of low wheat prices by 
forcing all Americans to buy a specific amount of wheat or pay a penalty for 
failing to do so, even though virtually all Americans will inevitably eat wheat at 
some point, and an individual’s failure to buy a specific amount of wheat, when 
viewed in the aggregate, would substantially affect overall demand for wheat and 
wheat prices.  To do so, Congress would have violated the Commerce Clause as it 
has through the individual mandate. 
The district courts that have held the individual mandate unconstitutional 
have correctly noted that a key aspect of Wickard and other cases upholding 
regulations under the Commerce Clause is the presence of voluntary economic 
activity subjecting an individual to Congressional power.  Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 
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2d at 780 (noting that an economic activity “voluntarily placed the subject within 
the stream of commerce.  Absent that step, governmental regulation could have 
been avoided.”); Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *72, n.14 (noting that 
“the individuals being regulated . . . were engaged in an activity . . . and each had 
the choice to discontinue that activity and avoid penalty”). 
Unlike the law at issue in Wickard, the individual mandate is not triggered 
by any voluntary economic activity, nor can an individual avoid its application by 
ceasing an ongoing economic activity.  As three former U.S. Attorneys General 
have explained, 
the private parties in Wickard and its progeny affected the relevant 
market in the same way local bootleggers affect, in the aggregate, the 
liquor market.  But the inactive private parties here affect the market 
only in the way a teetotaler affects the liquor market.  The fact that the 
“substantial effects” cases authorize regulating a local bootlegger does 
not remotely authorize conscripting a teetotaler to buy liquor. 
 
Brief for Former U.S. Attorneys General William Barr, Edwin Meese, III, and 
Dick Thornburgh as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at 11-12, Virginia ex rel. 
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius (4th Cir. Apr. 4, 2011) (Nos. 11-1057 & 11-1058). 
b. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) 
 Raich does not support the individual mandate either.  In Raich, individuals 
who wanted to use marijuana for medicinal purposes brought an as-applied 
challenge (not a facial challenge as Plaintiffs bring here) to the Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA), which created a “closed regulatory system” governing the 
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manufacture, distribution, and possession of controlled substances to “conquer 
drug abuse and to control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled 
substances.”  545 U.S. at 12-13.  Importantly, the Raich plaintiffs did not contend 
(as Plaintiffs do here with the PPACA) “that any provision or section of the CSA 
amounts to an unconstitutional exercise of congressional authority.”  Id. at 15.  As 
such, the narrow issue before the Raich Court was “whether Congress’ power to 
regulate interstate markets for medicinal substances encompasses the portions of 
those markets that are supplied with drugs produced and consumed locally.”  Id. at 
9. 
 The Court held that “[t]he CSA is a valid exercise of federal power, even as 
applied to the troubling facts of this case.”  Id.  The Court stated, “[o]ur case law 
firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are part 
of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.”  Id. at 17 (emphasis added) (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 
146, 151 (1971)).  Moreover, “[w]hen Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ 
of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class.”  
Id. (citing Perez, 402 U.S. at 154-55).  As such, “when ‘a general regulatory statute 
bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual 
instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.’”  Id. (citation omitted). 
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 The Court stated that Wickard’s key holding was that “Congress can regulate 
purely intrastate activity that is not itself ‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced 
for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut 
the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.”  Id. at 18.  Unlike the 
non-economic activities at issue in Lopez and Morrison, “the activities regulated 
by the CSA are quintessentially economic. . . .  The CSA . . . regulates the 
production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an 
established, and lucrative, interstate market.”  Id. at 25-26 (emphasis added).  In 
addition, 
Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the 
intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a 
gaping hole in the CSA.  Thus, as in Wickard, when it enacted 
comprehensive legislation to regulate the interstate market in a 
fungible commodity, Congress was acting well within its authority. 
 
Id. at 22.  The Court described the marijuana ban as “merely one of many 
‘essential part[s] of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the 
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.’”  
Id. at 24-25 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
 Significantly, unlike Raich, the instant case does not involve an as-applied 
challenge to a concededly valid regulatory scheme; rather, Plaintiffs contend that 
the individual mandate exceeds Congress’s authority on its face.  Thus, Raich’s 
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emphasis on the reluctance of courts to prohibit individual applications of a valid 
statutory scheme to local economic conduct is not implicated here. 
 Also, the statute in Raich discouraged an ongoing “quintessentially 
economic” activity:  “the production, distribution, and consumption of 
commodities for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market.”  
Id. at 25-26.  The Court repeatedly emphasized Congress’s authority to target an 
ongoing economic class of activities.  Id. at 17.  By contrast, the individual 
mandate does not regulate an ongoing economic class of activities “within the 
reach of federal power.”  See id. at 23.  Lawful presence in the United States, 
without more, is not an economic activity akin to producing and distributing a 
marketable commodity.  Raich does not suggest that the targeted economic class of 
activities may include the failure to buy something. 
 In addition, statements in Raich concerning Congress’s ability to enact a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme targeting ongoing economic activity have no 
bearing on the individual mandate.  Raich held only that federal regulation of 
economic activity—such as producing and consuming a marketable commodity—
can, in some circumstances, reach that economic activity at a local level when 
doing so is necessary and proper to the effective national regulation of that 
economic activity.   
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Raich and other Commerce Clause cases do not suggest that Congress can—
for the first time in our Nation’s history—use its Commerce Clause power to 
require individuals who are not engaging in a particular economic activity to do so 
solely because other statutory provisions are connected with that mandate.  
Consequently, the district court erred in concluding that Raich supports the 
individual mandate.  JA 144-46. 
3. Cases affirming Congress’s power to regulate an economic 
class of activities, in the aggregate, do not support the 
district court’s conclusion that Congress can regulate all 
uninsured individuals now because some will receive health 
care that they cannot pay for in the future. 
 
 The district court incorrectly held that the aggregation principle (or 
economic class of activities test) allows Congress to regulate a group now because 
a small subset of that group will, in the future, engage in an economic activity 
within Congress’s power to regulate.  JA 149-56.  The district court’s holding was 
based upon Defendants’ argument that because some uninsured individuals will, at 
some point in the future, enter the health insurance market or receive health care 
services that they cannot pay for, Congress has the authority to regulate all 
uninsured individuals now and on a continuing basis for the rest of their lives. 
 As set forth in the Supreme Court’s cases, the aggregation principle allows 
Congress to regulate individuals who are voluntarily engaged in economic activity 
when their individual conduct, taken in the aggregate with the similar conduct of 
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others, substantially affects interstate commerce.  See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; 
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981) 
(stating that local activity “may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, 
combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among 
the States.”).  Under this line of cases, the “class” that Congress can regulate 
consists of individuals who are voluntarily engaged in the relevant economic 
activity; Supreme Court jurisprudence does not suggest that Congress may reach 
individuals who are not engaged in the relevant economic activity.  See Raich, 545 
U.S. 1 (upholding regulation of individuals who grew marijuana); Katzenbach v. 
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300-02 (1964) (upholding regulation of individuals who 
operated restaurants); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 
(1964) (upholding regulation of individuals who operated motels).6/ 
 In Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), a loan shark argued that a 
federal law prohibiting extortionate credit transactions could not be applied to his 
local activities.  The Court stated that “[w]here the class of activities is regulated 
and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power ‘to 
                                                 
6/ Although courts must “determine whether Congress had a rational basis 
that is not overly attenuated for concluding that the class of activity substantially 
affects interstate commerce,” JA 135-36, the individual mandate raises the distinct, 
novel issue of whether Congress may regulate a group because of the activities of a 
small subset of that group.  Thus, the rational basis language from the Commerce 
Clause cases provides no support for Defendants’ position on this issue. 
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excise, as trivial, individual instances’ of the class.”  Id. at 154.  The Court 
observed that, as a loan shark, “Petitioner is clearly a member of the class which 
engages in ‘extortionate credit transactions’ as defined by Congress.”  Id. at 153 
(emphasis added).  In other words, the relevant “class” subject to regulation 
consists of those who actually engage in the relevant economic conduct.  See also 
United States v. Bruce, 405 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The Supreme Court . . . 
reasoned that, as long as Perez was a ‘member of the class which engages in 
‘extortionate credit transactions’ as defined by Congress,’ then the statute was 
properly applied”). 
The district court greatly expanded the aggregation principle: 
[e]ven assuming . . . that Plaintiffs Lee and Seven-Sky do remain 
committed to refusing medical care throughout their lives, Congress 
may still regulate the larger class of individuals when it “decides that 
the total incidence of a practice poses a threat to a national 
market.” . . .  Consequently, the Court looks not to Plaintiffs’ 
particular situation, but must ask instead whether the practice of the 
broader class of uninsured individuals threatens the national health 
care market. . . .  Because this Court has determined that the practices 
of the broader class of uninsured individuals substantially affects the 
health care market, Plaintiffs’ own individual activity may be 
regulated pursuant to Congress’s Commerce Clause power. 
 
JA 155 (emphasis added). 
 The district court erroneously imputed the future conduct of a small subset 
of uninsured individuals to the entire group of uninsured individuals, holding that 
Congress may force all uninsured individuals to maintain health insurance 
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indefinitely because some uninsured individuals will engage in a certain type of 
economic activity in the future.  The Florida decision aptly pointed out the key 
flaw in this reasoning: 
The uninsured can only be said to have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce in the manner as described by the defendants: (i) 
if they get sick or injured; (ii) if they are still uninsured at that specific 
point in time; (iii) if they seek medical care for that sickness or injury; 
(iv) if they are unable to pay for the medical care received; and (v) if 
they are unable or unwilling to make payment arrangements directly 
with the health care provider, or with assistance of family, friends, and 
charitable groups, and the costs are thereafter shifted to others. 
 
. . . . [A] number of the uninsured are taking the five sequential steps.  
And when they do, Congress plainly has the power to regulate them at 
that time (or even at the time that they initially seek medical 
care) . . . .  But, to cast the net wide enough to reach everyone in the 
present, with the expectation that they will (or could) take those steps 
in the future, goes beyond the existing “outer limits” of the Commerce 
Clause. 
 
Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *92-95 (emphasis added). 
 The district court’s broad expansion of the aggregation principle finds no 
support in the Supreme Court’s cases.  While Congress has broad authority 
“[w]here the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of 
federal power,” Raich, 545 U.S. at 23 (emphasis added), the individual mandate 
does not regulate a class of economic activities; its application is not tied to any 
specific commercial transaction or economic conduct.  Under the district court’s 
analysis, Congress could have regulated all individuals present within Montgomery 
County, Ohio, because some of those individuals (such as Roscoe Filburn, a party 
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in Wickard) would grow too much wheat in the future, and, inevitably, they would 
all eat American-grown wheat at some point in their lives.  The district court’s 
approach ignores the fact that, while Filburn subjected himself to Congressional 
authority by growing wheat, the application of the individual mandate is not 
triggered by any voluntary economic activity. 
Moreover, in cases such as Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach, an 
individual’s voluntary economic activity (operating a hotel, restaurant, etc.) is what 
brought him within the reach of Congress’s regulatory power, and only for the 
duration of that economic activity.  379 U.S. 241; 379 U.S. 294.  Congress could 
not have regulated all Americans who have business degrees on the theory that 
Americans with business degrees, in the aggregate, operate (or may operate in the 
future) many businesses that substantially affect interstate commerce. 
If, for the first time in our nation’s history, the Commerce Clause is 
interpreted to authorize Congress to regulate all Americans, for their entire lives, 
regardless of the lack of relevant current economic or commercial activity by those 
regulated, Congress would have “a plenary police power that would authorize 
enactment of every type of legislation,” one “of the sort retained by the States.”  
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
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4. There is no support for the district court’s holding that 
Congress can regulate all Americans now, and indefinitely 
for their entire lives, based on their “inevitable” future 
participation in a market. 
 
The inevitability of an individual’s participation in a market at some point in 
his or her lifetime does not give Congress plenary authority to regulate that 
individual for his or her entire lifetime.  Defendants have “provided no authority 
for the suggestion that once someone is in the health insurance market at a 
particular point in time, they are forever in that market, always subject to 
regulation, and not ever permitted to leave.”  See Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8822, at *96, n.22.  The district court, however, held that Congress may regulate 
all Americans, indefinitely, without any showing that the regulated individual is 
presently engaged in a relevant economic activity, because all Americans will, at 
some point in their lives, receive health care services.  JA 148-51. 
 The implications of this unprecedented line of reasoning are stunning.  There 
are countless markets in which virtually all Americans will, at some point in their 
lives, take part: markets for food, water, clothing, transportation, housing, 
education, jobs, utilities, and recreation, to name a few.  Congress has no authority 
to regulate the intricacies of all Americans’ daily lives and mandate their 
purchases, every day from their birth until their death, simply because they will, at 
some point, participate in the market for these items and services.  Congress may 
regulate commercial or economic activities when they occur.  Congress cannot 
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impose onerous mandates on all Americans, owing to their mere existence, on the 
premise that all Americans will engage in interstate commerce at some point.  
Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 781 (noting that the government’s “broad definition of 
the economic activity subject to congressional regulation lacks logical limitation 
and is unsupported by Commerce Clause jurisprudence”).   
 The district court’s analysis is based upon the false premise that declining to 
buy health insurance is “not simply a decision whether to consume a particular 
good or service, but ultimately a decision as to how health care services are to be 
paid and who pays for them.”  JA 150.  The decisions of the other two district 
courts that have upheld the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause were 
based on this same faulty premise.  Liberty University v. Geithner, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 125922, at *49-50 (W.D. Va. 2010); TMLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
107416, at *26.  The Florida court correctly rejected this “financing decision” 
premise, noting that the government’s theory 
is essentially true of any and all forms of insurance. It could just as 
easily be said that people without burial, life, supplemental income, 
credit, mortgage guaranty, business interruption, or disability 
insurance have made the exact same or similar economic and 
financing decisions based on their expectation that they will not incur 
a particular risk at a particular point in time; or that if they do, it is 
more beneficial for them to self-insure and try to meet their 
obligations out-of-pocket, but always with the benefit of “backstops” 
provided by law, including bankruptcy protection and other 
government-funded financial assistance and services. . . .  The 
“economic decision” to forego virtually any and all types of insurance 
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can (and cumulatively do) similarly result in significant cost-shifting 
to third parties. 
 
Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *100-01. 
 The district court’s reasoning is similar to Defendants’ erroneous assertion 
that the individual mandate is akin to regulating “a decision to pay by credit card 
rather than by check.”  Memo Sup. Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 15-1, at 26 (Aug. 20, 
2010).  This analogy overlooks the speculative nature of insurance systems.  
Paying the exact amount of a debt that an individual has incurred with a check or 
credit card is entirely different from paying into a risk-based insurance system on a 
regular and continuous basis, regardless of whether the individual incurs any debts 
that insurance will partially offset.  It is inaccurate to imply that medical care is 
paid for in advance by purchasing insurance; insurance only pays for a percentage 
of any health care services rendered (often a small one) in most instances.  An 
insured person is still responsible to pay deductibles, co-pays, a percentage of the 
cost of any care rendered, and other costs out-of-pocket.  As such, Congress has 
not merely chosen the method (check, credit card, etc.) by which a consumer pays 
for goods or services voluntarily purchased, but has dictated that all Americans 
join a distinct, risk-based insurance market to purportedly lessen, but not eliminate, 
speculative out-of-pocket costs of hypothetical health care purchases that they (or 
others) may or may not make in the future. 
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5. As in Lopez and Morrison, Defendants’ arguments, adopted 
by the district court, lack a limiting principle and, if 
accepted, would give rise to a federal police power.  
 
 The Supreme Court has emphasized the need to identify clear limiting 
principles when assessing a purported exercise of the Commerce Clause power to 
prevent converting that power into “a general police power of the sort retained by 
the States.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68; see also id. at 578 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (stating that “the federal balance is too essential a part of our 
constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to 
admit inability to intervene when one or the other level of Government has tipped 
the scales too far”).  The Constitution’s creation of a system of dual sovereignty is 
based upon the premise that “a healthy balance of power between the States and 
the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either 
front.”  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); see also Morrison, 529 
U.S. at 616, n.7 (characterizing the principle of dual sovereignty as a “central 
principle of our constitutional system. . . . crafted . . . so that the people’s rights 
would be secured by the division of power”). 
The district court’s novel theory of virtually unlimited Commerce Clause 
power is at odds with the Constitution’s delegation of a few, limited powers to the 
federal government.  As James Madison noted in Federalist No. 45, 
[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal 
government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the 
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State governments are numerous and indefinite. . . .  The powers 
reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in 
the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and 
properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and 
prosperity of the State. 
 
The Federalist No. 45, at 241 (James Madison) (George Carey & James McClellan 
eds., 2001).  The district court’s analysis of the Commerce Clause would bestow 
upon Congress “numerous and indefinite” powers to regulate “the lives, liberties, 
and properties of the people,” while leaving the States to regulate only that which 
Congress declines, for the moment, to regulate.  See id. 
 The primary limiting principle that Defendants offer is the statement that no 
individual can permanently opt out of the interstate health care market.  JA 148-51.  
As the Florida decision noted, however, 
there are lots of markets—especially if defined broadly enough—that 
people cannot “opt out” of.  For example, everyone must participate in 
the food market. . . .  [Under this logic,] Congress could require that 
people buy and consume broccoli at regular intervals, not only 
because the required purchases will positively impact interstate 
commerce, but also because people who eat healthier tend to be 
healthier, and are thus more productive and put less of a strain on the 
health care system.  Similarly, because virtually no one can be 
divorced from the transportation market, Congress could require that 
everyone above a certain income threshold buy a General Motors 
automobile—now partially government-owned—because those who 
do not buy GM cars (or those who buy foreign cars) are adversely 
impacting commerce and a taxpayer-subsidized business. 
 
Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *85-87.  The Virginia decision also 
observed that the government’s reasoning “could apply to transportation, housing, 
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or nutritional decisions.”  Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 781; see also Florida, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *89 (asking whether Congress could “require 
individuals above a certain income level to purchase a home financed with a 
mortgage . . . in order to add stability to the housing and financial markets”). 
 Another purported limiting principle that Defendants offer is the fact that 
federal law mandates that doctors and hospitals provide certain services, regardless 
of the recipient’s ability to pay.  JA 148-56; Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.7/  The district court reasoned that this case is 
different from numerous hypothetical scenarios that would illustrate the breadth of 
Defendants’ legal theories because, unlike in other markets, health care providers 
may not decline to provide services.  JA 148-50. 
This attempt to establish a limiting principle is flawed for at least three 
reasons.  First, the hypotheticals that best illustrate the lack of any limiting 
principle include a mandate to sell or provide services analogous to the emergency 
treatment mandate.  For example, as Plaintiffs’ counsel noted at oral argument on 
the motion to dismiss, Defendants’ theory would support a mandate that all 
                                                 
7/ The existence of so-called “uncompensated” care is unsurprising because, 
by definition, someone other than the recipient (taxpayers, the health care provider, 
other health care consumers, insurance companies, etc.) will end up bearing the 
cost for such care.  Any federal law designed to address how such care is paid for, 
no matter how well intentioned, must comply with the Constitution, and the 
individual mandate exceeds Congress’s authority. 
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Americans above a certain income level buy a General Motors vehicle so long as it 
was accompanied by a mandate that General Motors dealers provide vehicles to all 
who demonstrate a need for them (regardless of their ability to pay).  JA 212-13.  
Defendants could cite Congress’s authority to regulate the automobile market, the 
fact that there would (literally) be some “free riders” without the mandate to 
purchase, and the fact that, inevitably, everyone takes part in the transportation 
market.8/  The wide-ranging impact of Defendants’ arguments cannot be avoided 
simply by stating that “automobile manufacturers are not required by law to give 
cars to people who show up at their door in need of transportation but without the 
money to pay for it.”  JA 149. 
 Second, this purported limiting principle is illusory, as it is based solely 
upon the fact that, at present, Congress has elected to impose a provider mandate 
regarding emergency health care but not other goods or services.  The Supreme 
Court rejected a similar argument in Morrison.  Although the statute prohibited its 
application in family law cases, the Court noted that “[u]nder our written 
Constitution, however, the limitation of congressional authority is not solely a 
                                                 
8/ With respect to this hypothetical, the Florida decision noted, “in the 
course of defending the Constitutionality of the individual mandate, . . . often-cited 
law professor and dean of the University of California Irvine School of Law Erwin 
Chemerinsky has opined that . . . ‘Congress could use its commerce power to 
require people to buy cars.’ . . .  When I mentioned this to the defendants’ attorney 
at oral argument, he allowed for the possibility that ‘maybe Dean Chemerinsky is 
right.’”  Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *87-88. 
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matter of legislative grace.”  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616; see also id. at 616, n.7 
(noting that courts have the authority to decide whether Congress has exceeded the 
outer bounds of its power, while “political accountability is and has been the only 
limit on Congress’ exercise of the commerce power within that power’s outer 
bounds”).  Congress cannot support an unconstitutional assertion of power by 
simply making a non-binding promise not to go even further in the future.  Cf. 
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010) (“We would not uphold an 
unconstitutional statute merely because the Government promised to use it 
responsibly.”). 
 Third, the district court reasoned that “[w]hen a supplier is obligated by law 
to produce goods or services for free, there is bound to be a substantial effect on 
market prices if consumers’ behavior results in that obligation’s frequent 
invocation.”  JA 149.  Rather than serving as a limiting principle, this illustrates the 
lack of a limiting principle by suggesting that Congress has broad power to impose 
mandates upon providers and then “correct” the Congressionally-exacerbated 
market imbalance by imposing mandates to buy upon unwilling individuals. 
 The findings Congress set forth in Section 1501 to support the individual 
mandate illustrate the limitless bounds of Congress’s power under Defendants’ 
theory.  Congress stated that “[t]he economy loses up to $207,000,000,000 a year 
because of the poorer health and shorter lifespan of the uninsured,” and declared 
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that the individual mandate would “significantly reduce this economic cost.”  § 
1501(a)(2)(E), as amended by § 10106(a); JA 65.  If the economic impact of 
Americans’ poor health provided a sufficient basis for Congress to mandate that 
individuals buy health insurance, Congress could also mandate that individuals 
take other actions considered necessary to improve health and lengthen life 
expectancies—such as requiring Americans to buy a gym membership, keep a 
specific body weight, or maintain a healthier diet—or pay penalties for failing to 
do so.  See Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *103, n.25 (“under the 
defendants’ rationale . . . Congress may also regulate the ‘economic decisions’ not 
to go to the doctor for regular check-ups and screenings.”); Brief for Members of 
the United States Senate as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at 11, Florida v. 
U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822 (N.D. Fla. 2011) 
(No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT) (“this same rationale would allow Congress to punish 
individuals for not purchasing health-related products, like vitamin supplements, 
on the ground that their failure to do so would increase health care costs by not 
ameliorating or preventing health conditions, like osteoporosis.”). 
 Congress also alleged that the individual mandate would lower the cost of 
health insurance premiums for those who buy insurance by reducing cost-shifting.  
§ 1501(a)(2)(F), as amended by § 10106(a); JA 65.  The government made a 
similar cost-shifting argument in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64, but the Supreme Court 
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held that Congress can only reach “economic activity” that substantially affects 
interstate commerce; neither gun possession nor lawful presence in the United 
States is economic activity. 
 In a similar vein, Congress declared that requiring individuals to buy health 
insurance will benefit those who participate in the health insurance market in 
various ways, such as by “creating effective health insurance markets in which 
improved health insurance products . . . can be sold,” “reduc[ing] administrative 
costs[,] and lower[ing] health insurance premiums.”  § 1501(a)(2)(I), (J), as 
amended by § 10106(a); JA 65-66.  Similar arguments, however, could be made 
for virtually any market, as forcing unwilling participants into a market would 
likely benefit voluntary market participants in a variety of ways. 
In sum, Section 1501’s unprecedented mandate to buy a product from a 
private company is inconsistent with our constitutional tradition: 
What separates the United States from other countries is the minimal 
and fundamental nature of the duties its citizens owe the state.  During 
World War II, the people were not commandeered to work in defense 
plants or buy war bonds.  Even voting is not mandated in the United 
States. 
 
Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health 
Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 NYU J.L. & Liberty 581, 631 (2010).  
Although the PPACA is the first federal law relying on the Commerce Clause to 
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cross the line between encouraging increased market activity and mandating 
individual purchases, it will certainly not be the last if Section 1501 is upheld. 
B. The individual mandate is not authorized by the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. 
 
 Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, 
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”  The individual mandate exceeds 
Congress’s authority under this Clause, a provision that the Supreme Court has 
characterized as “the last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional 
action.”  Printz, 521 U.S. at 923. 
 Although Defendants have focused their attention on the alleged necessity of 
the individual mandate to avoid negative consequences that other portions of the 
PPACA would create, necessity is only half of the equation; a federal law must 
also be proper (i.e., consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution and our 
system of dual sovereignty) to be within the scope of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  See, e.g., id. at 923-24 (noting that a law is not “proper” if it “violates the 
principle of state sovereignty”).   
Given the wide-ranging implications of the arguments offered in support of 
the individual mandate, the fact that the Commerce Clause does not authorize 
Section 1501 (as discussed previously) illustrates that it also exceeds the scope of 
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the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 782 (the Clause 
“may only be constitutionally deployed when tethered to a lawful exercise of an 
enumerated power. . . .  [Section 1501] is neither within the letter nor the spirit of 
the Constitution.”); Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *114, *116 (“the 
individual mandate is neither within the letter nor the spirit of the Constitution.  To 
uphold that provision via application of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
would . . . effectively remove all limits on federal power. . . . By definition, it 
cannot be ‘proper.’”). 
 In a recent case, United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010), the 
Supreme Court upheld a federal civil commitment statute that authorized the 
continued detention of mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal prisoners beyond 
their normal release date.  The Court based its conclusion “on five considerations, 
taken together”: 
(1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the long 
history of federal involvement in this arena, (3) the sound reasons for 
the statute’s enactment in light of the Government’s custodial interest 
in safeguarding the public from dangers posed by those in federal 
custody, (4) the statute’s accommodation of state interests, and (5) the 
statute’s narrow scope. 
 
Id. at 1956, 1965. 
 Regarding the first factor, the Court stated that “the Necessary and Proper 
Clause grants Congress broad authority to enact federal legislation.”  Id. at 1956.  
The Court quoted McCulloch, which stated, “‘[l]et the end be legitimate, let it be 
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within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which 
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter 
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.’”  Id. (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. 
at 421).  A statute based upon the Necessary and Proper Clause must be “a means 
that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated 
power.”  Id. 
 With regard to the second and third factors, the Court characterized the 
statute as “a modest addition to a set of federal prison-related mental-health 
statutes that have existed for many decades.”  Id. at 1958.  The statute was a 
relatively minor supplement to another statute “which, since 1949, has authorized 
the post-sentence detention of federal prisoners who suffer from a mental illness 
and who are thereby dangerous (whether sexually or otherwise).”  Id. at 1961.  The 
statute satisfied “‘review for means-end rationality’” because it “represent[ed] a 
rational means for implementing a constitutional grant of legislative authority.”  Id. 
at 1962.  The Court held that the statute was “reasonably adapted” to “Congress’ 
power to act as a responsible federal custodian.”  Id. at 1961. 
 The Court also held that the statute met the fourth factor of “properly 
account[ing] for state interests.”  Id. at 1962.  The statute “require[d] 
accommodation of state interests” by providing the State in which the prisoner 
lived or was tried with a right to assume responsibility for the prisoner, which 
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would end federal government involvement.  Id. at 1962-63; see also id. at 1967-
68 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It is of fundamental importance to consider whether 
essential attributes [of federalism] are compromised by the assertion of federal 
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause; if so, that is a factor suggesting that 
the power is not one properly within the reach of federal power.”). 
 Finally, the Court held that “the links between [the statute] and an 
enumerated Article I power are not too attenuated.  Neither is the statutory 
provision too sweeping in its scope.”  Id. at 1963.  The link between the power to 
imprison offenders and the power to ensure that they do not endanger the safety of 
other prisoners or the public is a close one.  Id. at 1964.  Importantly, the Court’s 
holding would not “confer[] on Congress a general ‘police power, which the 
Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States’” because the 
statute was “narrow in scope.”  Id. (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618).  The 
statute had “been applied to only a small fraction of federal prisoners,” and its 
reach was “limited to individuals already in the custody of the Federal 
Government.”  Id. (citations omitted).  As such, the Court concluded that the 
statute was “a reasonably adapted and narrowly tailored means of pursuing the 
Government’s legitimate interest as a federal custodian in the responsible 
administration of its prison system.”  Id. at 1965. 
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 Section 1501 fails the Comstock factors and, therefore, exceeds Congress’s 
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Unlike the statute at issue in 
Comstock, the individual mandate is not “a modest addition” to previous federal 
law but rather is “sweeping in its scope.”  See id. at 1958, 1963.  There is no 
history at all of congressional mandates based upon the Commerce Clause 
requiring individuals to purchase a good or service.  See also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
563 (finding it significant that the Act “plows thoroughly new ground and 
represents a sharp break with the long-standing pattern of federal firearms 
legislation.”).  It takes an immense (and unconstitutional) leap to go from imposing 
regulations upon the health insurance industry to mandating individual 
participation in the health insurance market.  Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8822, at *106-07 (“A statute mandating that everyone purchase a product from a 
private company or be penalized (merely by virtue of being alive and a lawful 
citizen) is not a ‘modest’ addition to federal involvement in the national health care 
market, nor is it ‘narrow [in] scope.’”). 
 Moreover, the individual mandate tramples upon State interests.  Before 
Section 1501, States were free to determine whether to adopt a mandatory 
insurance system similar to Massachusetts’s or maintain a voluntary free market 
system.  See § 1501(a)(2)(D), as amended by § 10106(a); JA 65.  That is no longer 
the case.  If the individual mandate is upheld, many similar federal laws requiring 
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individuals to buy goods or services would be possible (perhaps likely), further 
eroding State and local government authority in favor of a broad federal police 
power. 
 In addition, the Constitution does not give Congress carte blanche to enact 
any provision of its choosing so long as it bears some connection to a larger 
regulatory scheme.  See generally Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1970 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“The Necessary and Proper Clause does not give Congress carte 
blanche”).  Section 1501’s findings section declares: 
[T]he Federal Government has a significant role in regulating health 
insurance.  [Section 1501] is an essential part of this larger regulation 
of economic activity, and the absence of the requirement would 
undercut Federal regulation of the health insurance market. 
 
§ 1501(a)(2)(H), as amended by § 10106(a); JA 65.  Congress made a similar 
argument with respect to the individual mandate’s connection to PPACA 
provisions prohibiting insurance companies from denying coverage based upon 
preexisting medical conditions.  § 1501(a)(2)(I), as amended by § 10106(a); JA 65.  
The implications of this line of reasoning are far-reaching for the reasons stated 
above with respect to the Commerce Clause.  Such a broad, unprecedented 
assertion of power clearly fails the test for “means-end rationality,” see Comstock, 
130 S. Ct. at 1961-62, and is by no means “appropriate” or “consist[ent] with the 
letter and spirit of the constitution,”  McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421.  In a word, it is 
not proper. 
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 In addition, Defendants have 
essentially admit[ed] that the Act will have serious negative 
consequences . . . unless the individual mandate is imposed.  Thus, 
rather than being used to implement or facilitate enforcement of the 
Act’s insurance industry reforms, the individual mandate is actually 
being used as the means to avoid the adverse consequences of the Act 
itself.  Such an application of the Necessary and Proper Clause would 
have the perverse effect of enabling Congress to pass ill-conceived, or 
economically disruptive statutes, secure in the knowledge that the 
more dysfunctional the results of the statute are, the more essential or 
“necessary” the statutory fix would be. . . .  This result would, of 
course, expand the Necessary and Proper Clause far beyond its 
original meaning, and allow Congress to exceed the powers 
specifically enumerated in Article I. 
 
Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *110-11 (emphasis added). 
 Because Congress lacked the Article I authority to enact the PPACA’s 
individual mandate, that mandate is unconstitutional.9/ 
II. THE THREATENED ENFORCEMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
MANDATE AGAINST PLAINTIFFS SEVEN-SKY AND LEE 
VIOLATES THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
RESTORATION ACT. 
 
 Section 1501 substantially burdens Plaintiffs Seven-Sky and Lee’s religious 
exercise by requiring them to either take actions contrary to their religious faith or 
                                                 
9/ Because the district court held that the individual mandate was valid, the 
court did not address the issue of severability that Plaintiffs raised in the Amended 
Complaint.  JA 38.  For the reasons set forth in the Florida decision, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *116-36, and Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 12, at 
58-60 (Aug. 10, 2010), Section 1501 is not severable and the PPACA is 
unconstitutional in its entirety. 
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pay annual penalties.  Because applying the individual mandate to these Plaintiffs 
is not the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest, 
doing so violates their rights as set forth in RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.  The 
district court erred in concluding that “§ 1501 does not place a substantial burden 
on the exercise of Plaintiffs’ Christian faith, and . . . is the least restrictive means of 
serving a compelling governmental interest.”  JA 166.   
Review of the district court’s dismissal of the RFRA claims is de novo, 
Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 676, and on a motion to dismiss, “a court must accept as 
true all of the [factual] allegations contained in a complaint,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 
S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 
 RFRA states that the federal government “shall not substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a), unless the government “demonstrates that 
application of the burden to the person . . . 1) is in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest; and 2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).  RFRA “restore[s] 
the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) 
and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).”  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b). 
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A. Substantial Burden 
 The religious exercise protected by RFRA “includes any exercise of religion, 
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb-2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)).  “A substantial burden exists 
when government action puts ‘substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his 
behavior and to violate his beliefs.’”  Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 678 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)). 
 The individual mandate substantially burdens Seven-Sky and Lee’s religious 
exercise for the reasons set forth in their Amended Complaint (as well as in their 
Statement of Material Facts and accompanying declarations).  JA 19-24, 37-38, 48-
52, 79-86.  In sum, these Plaintiffs strongly object to being required to either 
maintain health insurance or pay annual penalties because they believe that God 
will provide for their health and financial needs.  JA 49-52.  Their religious 
exercise is substantially burdened because they will be forced to pay penalties for 
refusing to act contrary to their religious principles. 
 The district court concluded that Plaintiffs’ religious exercise is not 
substantially burdened because Section 1501 “permits them to pay a shared 
responsibility payment in lieu of actually obtaining health insurance.”  JA 164.  
This holding squarely conflicts with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the 
case on which RFRA is modeled. 
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In Sherbert, the State of South Carolina denied a Seventh-Day Adventist’s 
application for unemployment benefits because she was fired for refusing to work 
on Saturday, even though Saturday was the Sabbath Day of her faith, and she was 
unable to obtain another job due to her religious objection.  Id. at 399-401.  Similar 
to the district court’s ruling here, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that 
the law did not substantially burden her religious exercise because she was not 
forced to work on her Sabbath.  Id. at 401. 
 The United States Supreme Court reversed, stating, 
We turn first to the question whether the disqualification for benefits 
imposes any burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion.  We 
think it is clear that it does. . . .  [N]ot only is it apparent that 
appellant’s declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the 
practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that 
practice is unmistakable.  The ruling forces her to choose between 
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the 
one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order 
to accept work, on the other hand.  Governmental imposition of such a 
choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion 
as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship. 
 
Id. at 403-04 (emphasis added). 
 Similarly, the individual mandate “forces [Seven-Sky and Lee] to choose 
between following the precepts of [their] religion and [paying annual penalties], on 
the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of [their] religion . . . on the 
other hand.”  See id.  It is especially telling that the Sherbert Court compared the 
loss of unemployment benefits to “a fine imposed against appellant for her 
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Saturday worship” because the individual mandate authorizes annual penalties 
against Seven-Sky and Lee for failing to indefinitely maintain health insurance. 
 The district court also stated (contrary to the factual allegations in the 
Amended Complaint, JA 19-24, 37-38, which a court must accept as true on a 
motion to dismiss, and without providing leave to amend) that “Plaintiffs have 
failed to allege any facts demonstrating that this conflict is more than a de minimus 
[sic] burden on their Christian faith.”  JA 163-64.  In effect, the court imposed a 
heightened pleading standard based upon this Court’s statement that “a burden on 
activity unimportant to the adherent’s religious scheme” cannot be a substantial 
burden, Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 678, which is simply another way of stating that 
the burden imposed must be substantial.10/  The district court’s heightened 
pleading standard conflicts with RFRA’s protection of “any exercise of religion, 
whether or not . . . central to, a system of religious belief” and ignores the 
sufficient allegations in the Amended Complaint.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2; see also 
JA 19-24, 37-38; Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50 (noting that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 “does 
not require ‘detailed factual allegations’” and “marks a notable and generous 
                                                 
10/ In Kaemmerling, the plaintiff merely objected to the government’s own 
conduct (extracting DNA from his blood, hair, etc.); he did not object to the 
removal of hair from his body.  As such, he was not put to a choice between some 
penalty and taking action that would violate his faith, as Plaintiffs here have 
alleged in their Amended Complaint concerning the individual mandate.  JA 19-24, 
37-38. 
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departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era”).  As 
noted previously, one’s religious exercise is substantially burdened when the 
government puts him to the choice of either incurring a penalty or violating his 
faith, and the Amended Complaint clearly illustrates how that is the case for 
Seven-Sky and Lee.  JA 19-24, 37-38. 
B. Strict Scrutiny 
 Defendants failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that applying 
Section 1501 to Seven-Sky and Lee is the least restrictive means of achieving a 
compelling government interest, and the district court erred in concluding 
otherwise.  JA 163-66.  “RFRA demands that ‘the compelling interest test [be] 
satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular 
claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.’”  
Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 682 (emphasis added).  “A statute or regulation is the 
least restrictive means if ‘no alternative forms of regulation would [accomplish the 
compelling interest] without infringing [religious exercise] rights.’”  Id. at 684 
(quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407). 
 Defendants cannot prove the existence of any compelling governmental 
interest that can be furthered only by requiring Seven-Sky and Lee to buy health 
insurance.  The justifications offered for the individual mandate, such as a desire to 
lower insurance premiums for those who are voluntarily insured, are not 
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“compelling” government interests, and forcing Plaintiffs to buy health insurance 
is not the least restrictive way to further such interests.   
In addition, although protecting public health is a compelling interest 
justifying some forms of regulation, the attenuated chain of reasoning it takes to go 
from the mere fact of being lawfully present in the United States without health 
insurance to a threat to public health is similar to Defendants’ attenuated reasoning 
concerning the impact on interstate commerce.  See Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 8822, at *92-95.  The reality is that the individual mandate was designed to 
force Plaintiffs into the health insurance market to benefit voluntary market 
participants and alleviate the PPACA’s negative consequences; Defendants’ claim 
that the individual mandate is necessary to protect public health during this 
litigation is merely self-serving. 
 Moreover, Plaintiffs do not object to the government spending public funds 
to provide other individuals with insurance; their objection to being required to 
maintain health insurance themselves is fundamentally different—it is specifically 
based on their religious faith and the government coercion to violate that faith or 
pay financial penalties for adhering to that faith.  JA 19-24, 37-38.  The 
government’s interest in ensuring that Americans who cannot provide for 
themselves receive public support of some kind is much stronger than its interest in 
forcing Plaintiffs to maintain health insurance.  See generally United States v. Lee, 
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455 U.S. 252, 258-60 (1982) (rejecting a challenge to the payment of Social 
Security taxes because it was indistinguishable from the payment of general 
income taxes, and the income tax system could not function if all individuals who 
object to any use of public funds were exempted or if contributions were 
voluntary). 
 Concerning Defendants’ attempt to demonstrate that the individual mandate 
is the least restrictive means available, the district court cited to Section 1501’s 
exceedingly narrow exemptions.  JA 165.  Seven-Sky and Lee have no reason to 
anticipate joining an Amish community or seeking and finding a health care 
sharing ministry eligible for an exemption whose religious tenets match their own.  
More importantly, Plaintiffs object to being forced to join a health insurance 
system against their will, regardless of whether that system is run by a private 
company or a religious organization to which Plaintiffs do not belong.  Section 
1501’s narrow religious exemptions are not a one-size-fits-all means of relieving 
any and all substantial burdens imposed by the individual mandate.11/ 
                                                 
11/ At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel cited the possibility of imposing a 
tax at the point of sale for those who receive health care without having health 
insurance as a less restrictive means of dealing with the issue of uncompensated 
care.  JA 215, 236.  Therefore, the District Court’s statement that Plaintiffs could 
not name a less restrictive alternative at oral argument is incorrect.  JA 165. 
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CONCLUSION 
 This Court should reverse the district court’s final decision and, in particular, 
hold that Section 1501 is unconstitutional and that the district court erred in 
dismissing Plaintiffs’ RFRA claims.  This case should be remanded for further 
consideration. 
 Respectfully submitted this 13th day of May, 2011. 
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124 STAT. 242 PUBLIC LAW 111-148--MAR. 23, 2010
"(36) the small employer health insurance credit deter-
mined under section 45R.".
(c) CREDIT ALLOWED AGAINST ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX.-
Section 38 ( c)(4)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (defining
26 USC 38 . specified credits ) is amended by redesignating clauses (vi), (vii),
and (viii ) as clauses (vii), (viii ), and (ix), respectively, and by
inserting after clause (v) the following new clause:
"(vi) the credit determined under section 45R,".
(d) DISALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION FOR CERTAIN EXPENSES FOR
WHICH CREDIT ALLOWED.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Section 280C of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 (relating to disallowance of deduction for certain
expenses for which credit allowed ), as amended by section
1401(b), is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
"(h) CREDIT FOR EMPLOYEE HEALTH INSURANCE EXPENSES OF
SMALL EMPLOYERS.-No deduction shall be allowed for that portion
of the premiums for qualified health plans ( as defined in section
1301(a) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act), or
for health insurance coverage in the case of taxable years beginning
in 2011, 2012 , or 2013, paid by an employer which is equal to
the amount of the credit determined under section 45R ( a) with
respect to the premiums.".
(2) DEDUCTION FOR EXPIRING CREDITS.-Section 196(c) of
such Code is amended by striking "and" at the end of paragraph
(12), by striking the period at the end of paragraph (13) and
inserting ", and", and by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
"(14) the small employer health insurance credit deter-
mined under section 45R(a).".
(e) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.-The table of sections for subpart
D of part IV of subchapter A of chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following:
"Sec. 45R . Employee health insurance expenses of small employers.".
Applicability. (U EFFECTIVE DATES.-
26 USC 38 note. (1 ) IN GENERAL.-The amendments made by this section
shall apply to amounts paid or incurred in taxable years begin-
ning after December 31, 2010.
(2) MINIMUM TAX.-The amendments made by subsection
(c) shall apply to credits determined under section 45R of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 in taxable years beginning
after December 31, 2010, and to carrybacks of such credits.
Subtitle F-Shared Responsibility for
Health Care
PART I--INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
42 USC 18091. SEC. 1501. REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COV-
ERAGE.
(a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings:
(1) IN GENERAL.-The individual responsibility requirement
provided for in this section (in this subsection referred to as
the "requirement ") is commercial and economic in nature, and
substantially affects interstate commerce, as a result of the
effects described in paragraph (2).
p. 2
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(2) EFFECTS ON THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND INTERSTATE
COMMERCE.--The effects described in this paragraph are the
following:
(A) The requirement regulates activity that is commer-
cial and economic in nature: economic and financial
decisions about how and when health care is paid for,
and when health insurance is purchased.
(B) Health insurance and health care services are a
significant part of the national economy. National health
spending is projected to increase from $2,500,000,000,000,
or 17.6 percent of the economy, in 2009 to
$4,700,000,000,000 in 2019. Private health insurance
spending is projected to be $854,000,000,000 in 2009, and
pays for medical supplies, drugs, and equipment that are
shipped in interstate commerce. Since most health insur-
ance is sold by national or regional health insurance compa-
nies, health insurance is sold in interstate commerce and
claims payments flow through interstate commerce.
(C) The requirement, together with the other provisions
of this Act, will add millions of new consumers to the
health insurance market, increasing the supply of, and
demand for, health care services. According to the Congres-
sional Budget Office, the requirement will increase the
number and share of Americans who are insured.
(D) The requirement achieves near-universal coverage
by building upon and strengthening the private • employer-
based health insurance system, which covers 176,000,000
Americans nationwide. In Massachusetts, a similar require-
ment has strengthened private employer-based coverage:
despite the economic downturn, the number of workers
offered employer-based coverage has actually increased.
(E) Half of all personal bankruptcies are caused in
part by medical expenses. By significantly increasing health
insurance coverage, the requirement, together with the
other provisions of this Act, will improve financial security
for families.
(F) Under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.), the Public Health
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.), and this Act, the Federal
Government has a significant role in regulating health
insurance which is in interstate commerce.
(G) Under sections 2704 and 2705 of the Public Health
Service Act (as added by section 1201 of this Act), if there
were no requirement, many individuals would wait to pur-
chase health insurance until they needed care. By signifi-
cantly increasing health insurance coverage, the require-
ment, together with the other provisions of this Act, will
minimize this adverse selection and broaden the health
insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which
will lower health insurance premiums. The requirement
is essential to creating effective health insurance markets
in which improved health insurance products that are
guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-
existing conditions can be sold.
(H) Administrative costs for private health insurance,
which were $90,000,000,000 in 2006, are 26 to 30 percent
of premiums in the current individual and small group
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markets. By significantly increasing health insurance cov-
erage and the size of purchasing pools, which will increase
economies of scale, the requirement, together with the other
provisions of this Act, will significantly reduce administra-
tive costs and lower health insurance premiums. The
requirement is essential to creating effective health insur-
ance markets that do not require underwriting and elimi-
nate its associated administrative costs.
(3) SUPREME COURT RULING.--In United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Association (322 U.S. 533 (1944)), the
Supreme Court of the United States ruled that insurance is
interstate commerce subject to Federal regulation.
(b) IN GENERAL.-Subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new chapter:
"CHAPTER 48-MAINTENANCE OF MINIMUM ESSENTIAL
COVERAGE
"Sec. 5000A. Requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage.
26 USC 5000A. "SEC. 5000A. REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COV-
ERAGE.
"(a) REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COV-
ERAGE.-An applicable individual shall for each month beginning
after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the
individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under min-
imum essential coverage for such month.
"(b) SHARED RESPONSIBILITY PAYMENT.---
Penalty. "(1) IN GENERAL.-If an applicable individual fails to meet
the requirement of subsection (a) for 1 or more months during
any calendar year beginning after 2013, then, except as pro-
vided in subsection (d), there is hereby imposed a penalty
with respect to the individual in the amount determined under
subsection (c).
"(2) INCLUSION WITH RETURN.-Any penalty imposed by
this section with respect to any month shall be included with
a taxpayer's return under chapter 1 for the taxable year which
includes such month.
"(3) PAYMENT OF PENALTY.-If an individual with respect
to whom a penalty is imposed by this section for any month-
"(A) is a dependent (as defined in section 152) of
another taxpayer for the other taxpayer's taxable year
including such month, such other taxpayer shall be liable
for such penalty, or
"(B) files a joint return for the taxable year including
such month, such individual and the spouse of such indi-
vidual shall be jointly liable for such penalty.
"(c) AMOUNT OF PENALTY.-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-The penalty determined under this sub-
section for any month with respect to any individual is an
amount equal to 442 of the applicable dollar amount for the
calendar year.
"(2) DOLLAR LIMITATION.-The amount of the penalty
imposed by this section on any taxpayer for any taxable year
with respect to all individuals for whom the taxpayer is liable
under subsection (b)(3) shall not exceed an amount equal to
300 percent the applicable dollar amount (determined without
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regard to paragraph (3)(C)) for the calendar year with or within
which the taxable year ends.
"(3) APPLICABLE DOLLAR AMOUNT.-For purposes of para-
graph (1)-
"(A) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in subpara-
graphs (B) and (C), the applicable dollar amount is 750.
"(B) PHASE IN.-The applicable dollar amount is $95
for 2014 and $350 for 2015.
"(C) SPECIAL RULE FOR INDIVIDUALS UNDER AGE 18.-
If an applicable individual has not attained the age of
18 as of the beginning of a month, the applicable dollar
amount with respect to such individual for the month shall
be equal to one-half of the applicable dollar amount for
the calendar year in which the month occurs.
"(D) INDEXING OF AMOUNT.-In the case of any calendar
year beginning after 2016, the applicable dollar amount
shall be equal to $750, increased by an amount equal
to-
"(i) $750, multiplied by
"(ii) the cost-of-living adjustment determined
under section 1(0(3) for the calendar year, determined
by substituting `calendar year 2015' for `calendar year
1992' in subparagraph (B) thereof.
If the amount of any increase under clause (i) is not a
multiple of $50, such increase shall be rounded to the
next lowest multiple of $50.
"(4) TERMS RELATING TO INCOME AND FAMILIES.-For pur-
poses of this section-
"(A) FAMILY SIZE.-The family size involved with
respect to any taxpayer shall be equal to the number of
individuals for whom the taxpayer is allowed a deduction
under section 151 (relating to allowance of deduction for
personal exemptions) for the taxable year.
"(B) HOUSEHOLD INCOME.-The term `household
income' means, with respect to any taxpayer for any taxable
year, an amount equal to the sum of-
"(i) the modified gross income of the taxpayer,
plus
"(ii) the aggregate modified gross incomes of all
other individuals who-
"(I) were taken into account in determining
the taxpayer's family size under paragraph (1),
and
"(II) were required to file a return of tax
imposed by section 1 for the taxable year.
"(C) MODIFIED GROSS INCOME.-The term `modified
gross income' means gross income-
"(i) decreased by the amount of any deduction
allowable under paragraph (1), (3), (4), or (10) of section
62(a),
"(ii) increased by the amount of interest received
or accrued during the taxable year which is exempt
from tax imposed by this chapter, and
"(iii) determined without regard to sections 911,
931, and 933.
"(D) POVERTY LINE.-
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"(i) IN GENERAL.-The term `poverty line' has the
meaning given that term in section 2110(c)(5) of the
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1397jj(c)(5)).
"(ii) POVERTY LINE USED.--In the case ' of any tax-
able year ending with or within a calendar year, the
poverty line used shall be the most recently published
poverty line as of the 1st day of such calendar year.
"(d) APPLICABLE INDIVIDUAL.--For purposes of this section-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-The term `applicable individual' means,
with respect to any month, an individual other than an indi-
vidual described in paragraph (2), (3), or (4).
"(2) RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS.-
"(A) RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE EXEMPTION,-Such term
shall not include any individual for any month if such
individual has in effect an exemption under section
1311(d)(4)(H) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act which certifies that such individual is a member of
a recognized religious sect or division thereof described
in section 1402(g)(1) and an adherent of established tenets
or teachings of such sect or division as described in such
section.
"(B) HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRY.-
"(i) IN GENERAL.-Such term shall not include any
individual for any month if such individual is a member
of a health care sharing ministry for the month.
"(ii) HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRY.--The term
`health care sharing ministry' means an organization-
"(I) which is described in section 501(c)(3) and
is exempt from taxation under section 501(a),
"(II) members of which share a common set
of ethical or religious beliefs and share medical
expenses among members in accordance with those
beliefs and without regard to the State in which
a member resides or is employed,
"(III) members of which retain membership
even after they develop a medical condition,
"(IV) which (or a predecessor of which) has
been in existence at all times since December 31,
1999, and medical expenses of its members have
been shared continuously and without interruption
since at least December 31, 1999, and
"(V) which conducts an annual audit which
is performed by an independent certified public
accounting firm in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles and which is made
available to the public upon request.
"(3) INDIVIDUALS NOT LAWFULLY PRESENT.-Such term shall
not include an individual for any month if for the month the
individual is not a citizen or national of the United States
or an alien lawfully present in the United States.
"(4) INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS.--Such term shall not
include an individual for any month if for the month the indi-
vidual is incarcerated, other than incarceration pending the
disposition of charges.
(e) EXEMPTIONS.-No penalty shall be imposed under sub-
section (a) with respect to-
"(1) INDIVIDUALS WHO CANNOT AFFORD COVERAGE.--
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"(A) IN GENERAL.--Any applicable individual for any
month if the applicable individual's required contribution
(determined on an annual basis) for coverage for the month
exceeds 8 percent of such individual's household income
for the taxable year described in section 1412(b)(1)(B) of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. For pur-
poses of applying this subparagraph, the taxpayer's house-
hold income shall be increased by any exclusion from gross
income for any portion of the required contribution made
through a salary reduction arrangement.
"(B) REQUIRED CONTRIBUTION.--For purposes of this Definition.
paragraph, the term `required contribution' means-
"(1) in the case of an individual eligible to purchase
minimum essential coverage consisting of coverage
through an eligible-employer-sponsored plan, the por-
tion of the annual premium which would be paid by
the individual (without regard to whether paid through
salary reduction or otherwise) for self only coverage,
or
"(ii) in the case of an individual eligible only to
purchase minimum essential coverage described in sub-
section (f)(1)(C), the annual premium for the lowest
cost bronze plan available in the individual market
through the Exchange in the State in the rating area
in which the individual resides (without regard to
whether the individual purchased a qualified health
plan through the Exchange), reduced by the amount
of the credit allowable under section 36B for the tax-
able year (determined as if the individual was covered
by a qualified health plan offered through the
Exchange for the entire taxable year).
"(C) SPECIAL RULES FOR INDIVIDUALS RELATED TO
EMPLOYEES.--For purposes of subparagraph (B)(i), if an
applicable individual is eligible for minimum essential cov-
erage through an employer by reason of a relationship
to an employee, the determination shall be made by ref-
erence to the affordability of the coverage to the employee.
"(D) INDEXING.--In the case of plan years beginning Applicability.
in any calendar year after 2014, subparagraph (A) shall Determination.
be applied by substituting for `8 percent' the percentage
the Secretary of Health and Human Services determines
reflects the excess of the rate of premium growth between
the preceding calendar year and 2013 over the rate of
income growth for such period.
"(2) TAXPAYERS WITH INCOME UNDER 100 PERCENT OF POV-
ERTY LINE.--Any applicable individual for any month during
a calendar year if the individual's household income for the
taxable year described in section 1412(b)(1)(B) of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act is less than 100 percent
of the poverty line for the size of the family involved (deter-
mined in the same manner as under subsection (b)(4)).
"(3) MEMBERS OF INDIAN TRIBES.--Any applicable individual
for any month during which the individual is a member of
an Indian tribe (as defined in section 45A(c)(6)).
"(4) MONTHS DURING SHORT COVERAGE GAPS.--
"(A) IN GENERAL. Any month the last day of which
occurred during a period in which the applicable individual
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Applicability.
Definition,
was not covered by minimum essential coverage for a
continuous period of less than 3 months.
"(B) SPECIAL RULES.-For purposes of applying this
paragraph--
"(i) the length of a continuous period shall be deter-
mined without regard to the calendar years in which
months in such period occur,
"(ii) if a continuous period is greater than the
period allowed under subparagraph (A), no exception
shall be provided under this paragraph for any month
in the period, and
"(iii) if there is more than 1 continuous period
described in subparagraph (A) covering months in a
calendar year, the exception provided by this para-
graph shall only apply to months in the first of such
periods.
The Secretary shall prescribe rules for the collection of
the penalty imposed by this section in cases where contin-
uous periods include months in more than 1 taxable year.
"(5) HARDSHIPS. Any applicable individual who for any
month is determined by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services under section 1311(d)(4)(H) to have suffered a hardship
with respect to the capability to obtain coverage under a quali-
fied health plan.
"U) MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE,-For purposes of this sec-
tion-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-The term `minimum essential coverage'
means any of the following:
"(A) GOVERNMENT SPONSORED PROGRAMS.-Coverage
under--
"(i) the Medicare program under part A of title
XVIII of the Social Security Act,
"(ii) the Medicaid program under title XIX of the
Social Security Act,
"(iii) the CHIP program under title XXI of the
Social Security Act,
"(iv) the TRICARE for Life program,
"(v) the veteran's health care program under
chapter 17 of title 38, United States Code, or
"(vi) a health plan under section 2504(e) of title
22, United States Code (relating to Peace Corps volun-
teers).
"(B) EMPLOYER-SPONSORED PLAN.-Coverage under an
eligible employer-sponsored plan.
"(C) PLANS IN THE INDIVIDUAL MARKET.--Coverage
under a health plan offered in the individual market within
a State.
"(D) GRANDFATHERED HEALTH PLAN.-Coverage under
a grandfathered health plan.
"(E) OTHER COVERAGE.-Such other health benefits cov-
erage, such as a State health benefits risk pool, as the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, in coordination
with the Secretary, recognizes for purposes of this sub-
section.
"(2) ELIGIBLE EMPLOYER-SPONSORED PLAN.-The term
`eligible employer-sponsored plan' means, with respect to any
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employee, a group health plan or group health insurance cov-
erage offered by an employer to the employee which is--
"(A) a governmental plan (within the meaning of sec-
tion 2791(d)(8) of the Public Health Service Act), or
"(B) any other plan or coverage offered in the small
or large group market within a State.
Such term shall include a grandfathered health plan described
in paragraph (1)(D) offered in a group market.
"(3) EXCEPTED BENEFITS NOT TREATED AS MINIMUM ESSEN-
TIAL COVERAGE.--The term `minimum essential coverage' shall
not include health insurance coverage which consists of cov-
erage of excepted benefits-
"(A) described in paragraph (1) of subsection (c) of
section 2791 of the Public Health Service Act; or
"(B) described in paragraph (2), (3), or (4) of such
subsection if the benefits are provided under a separate
policy, certificate, or contract of insurance.
"(4) INDIVIDUALS RESIDING OUTSIDE UNITED STATES OR RESI-
DENTS OF TERRITORIES.-Any applicable individual shall be
treated as having minimum essential coverage for any month--
"(A) if such month occurs during any period described
in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 911(d)(1) which is
applicable to the individual, or
"(B) if such individual is a bona fide resident of any
possession of the United States (as determined under sec-
tion 937(a)) for such month.
"(5) INSURANCE-RELATED TERMS.-Any term used in this
section which is also used in title I of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act shall have the same meaning as when
used in such title.
"(g) ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURE.--
"(1) IN GENERAL.--The penalty provided by this section
shall be paid upon notice and demand by the Secretary, and
except as provided in paragraph (2), shall be assessed and
collected in the same manner as an assessable penalty under
subchapter B of chapter 68.
"(2) SPECIAL RULES.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law--
"(A) WAIVER OF CRIMINAL PENALTIES.-In the case of
any failure by a taxpayer to timely pay any penalty imposed
by this section, such taxpayer shall not be subject to any
criminal prosecution or penalty with respect to such failure.
"(B) LIMITATIONS ON LIENS AND LEVIES.-The Secretary
shall not--
"(i) file notice of lien with respect to any property
of a taxpayer by reason of any failure to pay the
penalty imposed by this section, or
"(ii) levy on any such property with respect to
such failure.".
(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.-The table of chapters for subtitle
D of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by inserting
after the item relating to chapter 47 the following new item:
"CHAPTER 4$-MAINTENANCE OF MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.".
(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendments made by this section 26 USC 5000A
shall apply to taxable years ending after December 31, 2013. note.
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(4) Section 1421(f) of this Act is amended by striking "2010" 26 USC 38 note.
both places it appears and inserting "2009".
(5) The amendments made by this subsection shall take effect 26 USC 45R note.
as if included in the enactment of section 1421 of this Act.
(U Part I of subtitle E of title I of this Act is amended by
adding at the end of subpart B, the following:
"SEC. 1416. STUDY OF GEOGRAPHIC VARIATION IN APPLICATION OF
FPL.
"(a) IN GENERAL.-The Secretary shall conduct a study to
examine the feasibility and implication of adjusting the application
of the Federal poverty level under this subtitle (and the amend-
ments made by this subtitle) for different geographic areas so
as to reflect the variations in cost-of-living among different areas
within the United States. If the Secretary determines that an Determination.
adjustment is feasible, the study should include a methodology
to make such an adjustment. Not later than January 1, 2013, Deadline.
the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on such study Reports.
and shall include such recommendations as the Secretary deter- Rohs menda-
mines appropriate.
"(b) INCLUSION OF TERRITORIES.-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-The Secretary shall ensure that the
study under subsection (a) covers the territories of the United
States and that special attention is paid to the disparity that
exists among poverty levels and the cost of living in such
territories and to the impact of such disparity on efforts to
expand health coverage and ensure health care.
"(2) TERRITORIES DEFINED.-In this subsection, the term
`territories of the United States' includes the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, the
Northern Mariana Islands, and any other territory or possession
of the United States.".
SEC. 10106. AMENDMENTS TO SUBTITLE F.
(a) Section 1501(a)(2) of this Act is amended to read as follows: 42 USC 18091.
"(2) EFFECTS ON THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND INTERSTATE
COMMERCE.-The effects described in this paragraph are the
following:
"(A) The requirement regulates activity that is commer-
cial and economic in nature: economic and financial
decisions about how and when health care is paid for,
and when health insurance is purchased. In the absence
of the requirement, some individuals would make an eco-
nomic and financial decision to forego health insurance
coverage and attempt to self insure, which increases finan-
cial risks to households and medical providers.
"(B) Health insurance and health care services are
a significant part of the national economy. National health
spending is projected to increase from $2,500,000,000,000,
or 17.6 percent of the economy, in 2009 to
$4,700,000,000,000 in 2019. Private health insurance
spending is projected to be $854,000,000,000 in 2009, and
pays for medical supplies, drugs, and equipment that are
shipped in interstate commerce. Since most health insur-
ance is sold by national or regional health insurance compa-
nies, health insurance is sold in interstate commerce and
claims payments flow through interstate commerce.
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"(C) The requirement, together with the other provi-
sions of this Act, will add millions of new consumers to
the health insurance market, increasing the supply of, and
demand for, health care services, and will increase the
number and share of Americans who are insured.
"(D) The requirement achieves near-universal coverage
by building upon and strengthening the private employer-
based health insurance system, which covers 176,000,000
Americans nationwide. In Massachusetts, a similar require-
ment has strengthened private employer-based coverage;
despite the economic downturn, the number of workers
offered employer-based coverage has actually increased.
"(E) The economy loses up to $207,000,000,000 a year
because of the poorer health and shorter lifespan of the
uninsured. By significantly reducing the number of the
uninsured, the requirement, together with the other provi-
sions of this Act, will significantly reduce this economic
cost.
"(F) The cost of providing uncompensated care to the
uninsured was $43,000,000,000 in 2008. To pay for this
cost, health care providers pass on the cost to private
insurers, which pass on the cost to families. This cost-
shifting increases family premiums by on average over
$1,000 a year. By significantly reducing the number of
the uninsured, the requirement, together with the other
provisions of this Act, will lower health insurance pre-
miums.
"(G) 62 percent of all personal bankruptcies are caused
in part by medical expenses. By significantly increasing
health insurance coverage, the requirement, together with
the other provisions of this Act, will improve financial
security for families.
"(H) Under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.), the Public Health
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.), and this Act, the Federal
Government has a significant role in regulating health
insurance. The requirement is an essential part of this
larger regulation of economic activity, and the absence
of the requirement would undercut Federal regulation of
the health insurance market.
"(I) Under sections 2704 and 2705 of the Public Health
Service Act (as added by section 1201 of this Act), if there
were no requirement, many individuals would wait to pur-
chase health insurance until they needed care. By signifi-
cantly increasing health insurance coverage, the require-
ment, together with the other provisions of this Act, will
minimize this adverse selection and broaden the health
insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which
will lower health insurance premiums. The requirement
is essential to creating effective health insurance markets
in which improved health insurance products that are
guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-
existing conditions can be sold.
"(J) Administrative costs for private health insurance,
which were $90,000,000,000 in 2006, are 26 to 30 percent
of premiums in the current individual and small group
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markets. By significantly increasing health insurance cov-
erage and the size of purchasing pools, which will increase
economies of scale, the requirement, together with the other
provisions of this Act, will significantly reduce administra-
tive costs and lower health insurance premiums. The
requirement is essential to creating effective health insur-
ance markets that do not require underwriting and elimi-
nate its associated administrative costs.".
(b)(1) Section 5000A(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
as added by section 1501(b) of this Act, is amended to read as 26 USC 5000A.
follows:
"(1) IN GENERAL.---If a taxpayer who is an applicable indi-
vidual, or an applicable individual for whom the taxpayer is
liable under paragraph (3), fails to meet the requirement of
subsection (a) for 1 or more months, then, except as provided
in subsection (e), there is hereby imposed on the taxpayer
a penalty with respect to such failures in the amount deter-
mined under subsection (c).".
(2) Paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 5000A(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as so added, are amended
to read as follows:
"(1) IN GENERAL.-The amount of the penalty imposed by
this section on any taxpayer for any taxable year with respect
to failures described in subsection (b)(1) shall be equal to the
lesser of-
"(A) the sum of the monthly penalty amounts deter-
mined under paragraph (2) for months in the taxable year
during which 1 or more such failures occurred, or
"(B) an amount equal to the national average premium
for qualified health plans which have a bronze level of
coverage, provide coverage for the applicable family size
involved, and are offered through Exchanges for plan years
beginning in the calendar year with or within which the
taxable year ends.
"(2) MONTHLY PENALTY AMOUNTS.-For purposes of para-
graph (1)(A), the monthly penalty amount with respect to any
taxpayer for any month during which any failure described
in subsection (b)(1) occurred is an amount equal to 1/12 of
the greater of the following amounts:
"(A) FLAT DOLLAR AMOUNT.--An amount equal to the
lesser of-
"(i) the sum of the applicable dollar amounts for
all individuals with respect to whom such failure
occurred during such month, or
"(ii) 300 percent of the applicable dollar amount
(determined without regard to paragraph (3)(C)) for
the calendar year with or within which the taxable
year ends.
"(B) PERCENTAGE OF INCOME.--An amount equal to
the following percentage of the taxpayer's household income
for the taxable year:
"(i) 0.5 percent for taxable years beginning in 2014.
"(ii) 1.0 percent for taxable years beginning in
2015.
"(iii) 2.0 percent for taxable years beginning after
2015.".
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(3) Section 5000A(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
26 USC 5000A. as added by section 1501(b) of this Act, is amended by striking
"$350" and inserting "$495".
(c) Section 5000A(d)(2)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as added by section 1501(b) of this Act, is amended to read
as follows:
"(A) RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE EXEMPTION.-Such term
shall not include any individual for any month if such
individual has in effect an exemption under section
1311(d)(4)(H) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act which certifies that such individual is-
"(i) a member of a recognized religious sect or
division thereof which is described in section
1402(g)(1), and
"(ii) an adherent of established tenets or teachings
of such sect or division as described in such section.".
(d) Section 5000A(e)(1)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as added by section 1501(b) of this Act, is amended to read
as follows:
"(C) SPECIAL RULES FOR INDIVIDUALS RELATED TO
EMPLOYEES.--For purposes of subparagraph (B)(i), if an
applicable individual is eligible for minimum essential cov-
erage through an employer by reason of a relationship
to an employee, the determination under subparagraph
(A) shall be made by reference to required contribution
of the employee.".
(e) Section 4980H(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
26 USC 4980H. as added by section 1513(a) of this Act, is amended to read as
follows:
"(b) LARGE EMPLOYERS WITH WAITING PERIODS EXCEEDING 60
DAYS.-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-In the case of any applicable large
employer which requires an extended waiting period to enroll
in any minimum essential coverage under an employer-spon-
sored plan (as defined in section 5000A(f)(2)), there is hereby
imposed on the employer an assessable payment of $600 for
each full-time employee of the employer to whom the extended
waiting period applies.
Definition. "(2) EXTENDED WAITING PERIOD.-The term `extended
waiting period' means any waiting period (as defined in section
2701(b)(4) of the Public Health Service Act) which exceeds
60 days.".
(0(1) Subparagraph (A) of section 4980H(d)(4) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as added by section 1513(a) of this Act,
is amended by inserting ", with respect to any month," after
"means".
(2) Section 4980H(d)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
as added by section 1513(a) of this Act, is amended by adding
at the end the following:
"(D) APPLICATION TO CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
EMPLOYERS.-In the case of any employer the substantial
annual gross receipts of which are attributable to the
construction industry--
"(i) subparagraph (A) shall be applied by sub-
stituting `who employed an average of at least 5 full-
time employees on business days during the preceding
calendar year and whose annual payroll expenses
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exceed $250,000 for such preceding calendar year' for
`who employed an average of at least 50 full-time
employees on business days during the preceding cal-
endar year', and
"(ii) subparagraph (B) shall be applied by sub-
stituting `5' for ` 50'.".
(3) The amendment made by paragraph (2) shall apply to
months beginning after December 31, 2013.
(g) Section 6056 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
added by section 1514 ( a) of the Act, is amended by adding at
the end the following new flush sentence:
"The Secretary shall have the authority to review the accuracy
of the information provided under this subsection , including the
applicable large employer 's share under paragraph (2)(C)(iv).".
SEC. 10107. AMENDMENTS TO SUBTITLE G.
(a) Section 1562 of this Act is amended , in the amendment
made by subsection (a)(2)(B)(iii ), by striking "subpart 1" and
inserting "subparts I and II"; and
(b) Subtitle G of title I of this Act is amended-
(1) by redesignating section 1562 (as amended) as section
1563; and
(2) by inserting after section 1561 the following:
"SEC. 1562 . GAO STUDY REGARDING THE RATE OF DENIAL OF COV-
ERAGE AND ENROLLMENT BY HEALTH INSURANCE
ISSUERS AND GROUP HEALTH PLANS.
"(a) IN GENERAL.-The Comptroller General of the United
States (referred to in this section as the `Comptroller General')
shall conduct a study of the incidence of denials of coverage for
medical services and denials of applications to enroll in health
insurance plans , as described in subsection (b), by group health
plans and health insurance issuers.
"(b) DATA.-
"(1) IN GENERAL .-In conducting the study described in
subsection (a), the Comptroller General shall consider samples
of data concerning the following:
"(A)(i) denials of coverage for medical services to a
plan enrollees , by the types of services for which such
coverage was denied; and
"(ii) the reasons such coverage was denied; and
"(B)(i) incidents in which group health plans and health
insurance issuers deny the application of an individual
to enroll in a health insurance plan offered by such group
health plan or issuer; and
"(ii) the reasons such applications are denied.
"(2) SCOPE OF DATA.-
"(A) FAVORABLY RESOLVED DISPUTES.-The data that
the Comptroller General considers under paragraph (1)
shall include data concerning denials of coverage for med-
ical services and denials of applications for enrollment in
a plan by a group health plan or health insurance issuer,
where such group health plan or health insurance issuer
later approves such coverage or application.
"(B) ALL HEALTH PLANS.-The study under this section
shall consider data from varied group health plans and
health insurance plans offered by health insurance issuers,
Applicability.
26 USC 4980H
note.
26 USC 6056.
42 USC
300gg-21.
26 USC 9815; 29
USC 1185d; 42
USC 300gg-1-
300gg-3,
300gg-9,
300gg-11,
300gg-12,
300gg-21-
300gg-23,
300gg-25-
300gg-28,
300gg-62,
300gg-91 , 18120.
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Advisory Panel for the purpose of examining and advising
the Secretary and Congress on workforce issues related to
personal care attendant workers , including with respect to the
adequacy of the number of such workers, the salaries, wages,
and benefits of such workers, and access to the services provided
by such workers.
(2) MEMBERSHIP .-In appointing members to the Personal
Care Attendants Workforce Advisory Panel , the Secretary shall
ensure that such members include the following:
(A) Individuals with disabilities of all ages.
(B) Senior individuals.
(C) Representatives of individuals with disabilities.
(D) Representatives of senior individuals.
(E) Representatives of workforce and labor organiza-
tions.
(F) Representatives of home and community-based
service providers.
(G) Representatives of assisted living providers.
(d) INCLUSION OF INFORMATION ON SUPPLEMENTAL COVERAGE
IN THE NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR LONG-TERM CARE INFORMA-
TION; EXTENSION OF FUNDING.-Section 6021(d) of the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C.1396p note ) is amended-
(1) in paragraph (2)(A)-
(A) in clause (ii), by striking "and" at the end;
(B) in clause (iii), by striking the period at the end
and inserting "; and"; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
"(iv) include information regarding the CLASS pro-
gram established under title XXXII of the Public
Health Service Act and coverage available for purchase
through a Exchange established under section 1311
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that
is supplemental coverage to the benefits provided
under a CLASS Independence Benefit Plan under that
program , and information regarding how benefits pro-
vided under a CLASS Independence Benefit Plan differ
from disability insurance benefits."; and
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking "2010" and inserting
"2015".
(e) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendments made by subsections
(a), (b), and (d) take effect on January 1, 2011.
(0 RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.-Nothing in this title or the amend-
ments made by this title are intended to replace or displace public
or private disability insurance benefits , including such benefits
that are for income replacement.
TITLE IX-REVENUE PROVISIONS
Subtitle A--Revenue Offset Provisions
SEC. 9001 , EXCISE TAX ON HIGH COST EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH
COVERAGE.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Chapter 43 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, as amended by section 1513, is amended by adding at
the end the following:
42 USC 30011
note.
42 USC 30011
note.
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26 USC 49801. "SEC. 49801 . EXCISE TAX ON HIGH COST EMPLOYER-SPONSORED
HEALTH COVERAGE.
"(a) IMPOSITION OF TAX.-If-
"(1) an employee is covered under any applicable employer-
sponsored coverage of an employer at any time during a taxable
period, and
"(2) there is any excess benefit with respect to the coverage,
there is hereby imposed a tax equal to 40 percent of the excess
benefit.
"(b) EXCESS BENEFIT.-For purposes of this section-
Definition , "(1) IN GENERAL.-The term `excess benefit' means, with
respect to any applicable employer-sponsored coverage made
available by an employer to an employee during any taxable
period , the sum of the excess amounts determined under para-
graph (2) for months during the taxable period.
"(2) MONTHLY EXCESS AMOUNT .-The excess amount deter-
mined under this paragraph for any month is the excess (if
any) of-
"(A) the aggregate cost of the applicable employer-
sponsored coverage of the employee for the month, over
"(B) an amount equal to /12 of the annual limitation
under paragraph (3) for the calendar year in which the
month occurs.
"(3) ANNUAL LIMITATION.-For purposes of this subsection-
"(A) IN GENERAL.-The annual limitation under this
paragraph for any calendar year is the dollar limit deter-
mined under subparagraph (C) for the calendar year.
"(B) APPLICABLE ANNUAL LIMITATION.-The annual
limitation which applies for any month shall be determined
on the basis of the type of coverage ( as determined under
subsection (0(1)) provided to the employee by the employer
as of the beginning of the month.
"(C) APPLICABLE DOLLAR LIMIT.-Except as provided
in subparagraph (D)-
"(i) 2013 .-In the case of 2013, the dollar limit
under this subparagraph is--
"(I) in the case of an employee with self only
coverage, $8,500, and
"(II) in the case of an em ployee with coverage
other than self -only coverage > $23 > 000.
"(ii) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS.-In the
case of an individual who is a qualified retiree or
who participates in a plan sponsored by an employer
the majority of whose employees are engaged in a
high-risk profession or employed to repair or install
electrical or telecommunications lines-
"(I) the dollar amount in clause (i)(I) (deter-
mined after the application of subparagraph (D))
shall be increased by $1,350, and
"(II) the dollar amount in clause (i)(II) (deter-
mined after the application of subparagraph (D))
shall be increased by $3,000.
"(iii) SUBSEQUENT YEARS.-In the case of any cal-
endar year after 2013, each of the dollar amounts
under clauses (i) and (ii) shall be increased to the
amount equal to such amount as in effect for the
p. 16
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"(B) the amount of any salary reduction contributions
to a flexible spending arrangement (within the meaning
of section 125).".
26 USC 6051 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE .-The amendments made by this section
note. shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2010.
SEC. 9003. DISTRIBUTIONS FOR MEDICINE QUALIFIED ONLY IF FOR
PRESCRIBED DRUG OR INSULIN.
(a) HSAs.-Subparagraph (A) of section 223(d )(2) of the Internal
26 USC 223 . Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the fol-
lowing: "Such term shall include an amount paid for medicine
or a drug only if such medicine or drug is a prescribed drug
(determined without regard to whether such drug is available with-
out a prescription) or is insulin.".
(b) ARCHER MSAS.-Subparagraph (A) of section 220(d)(2) of
26 USC 220 . the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the
end the following: "Such term shall include an amount paid for
medicine or a drug only if such medicine or drug is a prescribed
drug (determined without regard to whether such drug is available
without a prescription) or is insulin.".
(c) HEALTH FLEXIBLE SPENDING ARRANGEMENTS AND HEALTH
REIMBURSEMENT ARRANGEMENTS.-Section 106 of the Internal Rev-
26 USC 106 . enue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following
new subsection:
"U) REIMBURSEMENTS FOR MEDICINE RESTRICTED TO PRE-
SCRIBED DRUGS AND INSULIN .-For purposes of this section and
section 105, reimbursement for expenses incurred for a medicine
or a drug shall be treated as a reimbursement for medical expenses
only if such medicine or drug is a prescribed drug (determined
without regard to whether such drug is available without a prescrip-
tion) or is insulin.".
(d) EFFECTIVE DATES.-
26 USC 220 note. (1 ) DISTRIBUTIONS FROM SAVINGS ACCOUNTS .-The amend-
ments made by subsections (a) and (b) shall apply to amounts
paid with respect to taxable years beginning after December
31, 2010.
26 USC 106 note. (2) REIMBURSEMENTS .-The amendment made by sub-
section (c) shall apply to expenses incurred with respect to
taxable years beginning after December 31, 2010.
SEC. 9004. INCREASE IN ADDITIONAL TAX ON DISTRIBUTIONS FROM
HSAS AND ARCHER MSAS NOT USED FOR QUALIFIED
MEDICAL EXPENSES.
(a) HSAS.-Section 223 (f)(4)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 is amended by striking "10 percent" and inserting "20
percent".
(b) ARCHER MSAS.-Section 220 (f)(4)(A) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 is amended by striking " 15 percent" and inserting
"20 percent".
26 USC 220 note. (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendments made by this section
shall apply to distributions made after December 31, 2010.
SEC. 9005 . LIMITATION ON HEALTH FLEXIBLE SPENDING ARRANGE-
MENTS UNDER CAFETERIA PLANS.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code
26 USC 125 . of 1986 is amended-
(1) by redesignating subsections (i) and (j) as subsections
(j) and (k), respectively, and
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remuneration ' means , with respect to any applicable indi-
vidual for any disqualified taxable year , the aggregate
amount allowable as a deduction under this chapter for
such taxable year (determined without regard to this sub-
section ) for remuneration (as defined in paragraph (4) with-
out regard to subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) thereof) for
services performed by such individual (whether or not
during the taxable year). Such term shall not include any
deferred deduction remuneration with respect to services
performed during the disqualified taxable year.
"(E) DEFERRED DEDUCTION REMUNERATION .-For pur-
poses of this paragraph, the term `deferred deduction remu-
neration ' means remuneration which would be applicable
individual remuneration for services performed in a dis-
qualified taxable year but for the fact that the deduction
under this chapter (determined without regard to this para-
graph ) for such remuneration is allowable in a subsequent
taxable year.
"(F) APPLICABLE INDIVIDUAL.-For purposes of this
paragraph, the term `applicable individual ' means, with
respect to any covered health insurance provider for any
disqualified taxable year , any individual-
"(i) who is an officer , director, or employee in such
taxable year, or
"(ii) who provides services for or on behalf of such
covered health insurance provider during such taxable
year.
"(G) COORDINATION .-Rules similar to the rules of sub-
paragraphs (F) and (G) of paragraph (4) shall apply for
purposes of this paragraph.
"(H) REGULATORY AUTHORITY.-The Secretary may pre-
scribe such guidance , rules , or regulations as are necessary
to carry out the purposes of this paragraph.".
26 USC 162 note. (b) EFFECTIVE DATE. -The amendment made by this section
shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2009,
with respect to services performed after such date.
26 USC 3101.
SEC. 9015. ADDITIONAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE TAX ON HIGH -INCOME
TAXPAYERS.
(a) FICA.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Section 3101(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 is amended-
(A) by striking "In addition" and inserting the fol-
lowing:
"(1) IN GENERAL .-In addition",
(B) by striking "the following percentages of the" and
inserting " 1.45 percent of the",
(C) by striking "(as defined in section 3121(b))-" and
all that follows and inserting "(as defined in section
3121 (b)).", and
(D) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
"(2) ADDITIONAL TAX.-In addition to the tax imposed by
paragraph ( 1) and the preceding subsection , there is hereby
imposed on every taxpayer (other than a corporation , estate,
or trust ) a tax equal to 0.5 percent of wages which are received
with respect to employment (as defined in section 3121(b))
p. 18
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during any taxable year beginning after December 31, 2012,
and which are in excess of-
"(A) in the case of a joint return, $250,000, and
"(B) in any other case, $200,000.".
(2) COLLECTION OF TAX.-Section 3102 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the fol- 26 USC 3102.
lowing new subsection:
"(f) SPECIAL RULES FOR ADDITIONAL TAx.-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-In the case of any tax imposed by section
3101(b)(2), subsection (a) shall only apply to the extent to
which the taxpayer receives wages from the employer in excess
of $200,000, and the employer may disregard the amount of
wages received by such taxpayer's spouse.
"(2) COLLECTION OF AMOUNTS NOT WITHHELD.-To the
extent that the amount of any tax imposed by section 3101(b)(2)
is not collected by the employer, such tax shall be paid by
the employee.
"(3) TAX PAID BY RECIPIENT.-If an employer, in violation
of this chapter, fails to deduct and withhold the tax imposed
by section 3101(b)(2) and thereafter the tax is paid by the
employee, the tax so required to be deducted and withheld
shall not be collected from the employer, but this paragraph
shall in no case relieve the employer from liability for any
penalties or additions to tax otherwise applicable in respect
of such failure to deduct and withhold.".
(b) SECA.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Section 1401(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 is amended- 26 USC 1401.
(A) by striking "In addition" and inserting the fol-
lowing:
"(1) IN GENERAL.-In addition", and
(B) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
"(2) ADDITIONAL TAX.-
"(A) IN GENERAL.-In addition to the tax imposed by
paragraph (1) and the preceding subsection, there is hereby
imposed on every taxpayer (other than a corporation,
estate, or trust) for each taxable year beginning after
December 31, 2012, a tax equal to 0.5 percent of the self-
employment income for such taxable year which is in excess
of-
"(i) in the case of a joint return, $250,000, and
"(ii) in any other case, $200,000.
"(B) COORDINATION WITH FICA.-The amounts under
clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A) shall be reduced
(but not below zero) by the amount of wages taken into
account in determining the tax imposed under section
3121(b)(2) with respect to the taxpayer.".
(2) NO DEDUCTION FOR ADDITIONAL TAX.-
(A) IN GENERAL.-Section 164(f) of such Code is
amended by inserting "(other than the taxes imposed by
section 1401(b)(2))" after "section 1401)".
(B) DEDUCTION FOR NET EARNINGS FROM SELF-EMPLOY-
MENT.-Subparagraph (B) of section 1402(a)(12) is amended 26 USC 1402.
by inserting "(determined without regard to the rate
imposed under paragraph (2) of section 1401(b))" after "for
such year".
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26 USC 164 note. (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply with respect to remuneration received, and taxable
years beginning , after December 31, 2012.
SEC. 9016. MODIFICATION OF SECTION 833 TREATMENT OF CERTAIN
HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Subsection (c) of section 833 of the Internal
26 USC 833. Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
"(5) NONAPPLICATION OF SECTION IN CASE OF LOW MEDICAL
LOSS RATIO.-Notwithstanding the preceding paragraphs, this
section shall not apply to any organization unless such
organization 's percentage of total premium revenue expended
on reimbursement for clinical services provided to enrollees
under its policies during such taxable year (as reported under
section 2718 of the Public Health Service Act) is not less than
85 percent.".
26 USC 853 note. (b ) EFFECTIVE DATE .-The amendment made by this section
shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2009.
SEC. 9017 . EXCISE TAX ON ELECTIVE COSMETIC MEDICAL PROCE-
DURES.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 , as amended by this Act, is amended by adding at the
end the following new chapter:
"CHAPTER 49-ELECTIVE COSMETIC MEDICAL
PROCEDURES
"Sec. 5000B. Imposition of tax on elective cosmetic medical procedures.
26 USC 5000B. "SEC. 5000B . IMPOSITION OF TAX ON ELECTIVE COSMETIC MEDICAL
PROCEDURES.
"(a) IN GENERAL.-There is hereby imposed on any cosmetic
surgery and medical procedure a tax equal to 5 percent of the
amount paid for such procedure (determined without regard to
this section), whether paid by insurance or otherwise.
"(b) COSMETIC SURGERY AND MEDICAL PROCEDURE.-For pur-
poses of this section , the term `cosmetic surgery and medical proce-
dure ' means any cosmetic surgery (as defined in section 213(d)(9)(B))
or other similar procedure which-
"(1) is performed by a licensed medical professional, and
"(2) is not necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising
from, or directly related to , a congenital abnormality , a personal
injury resulting from an accident or trauma , or disfiguring
disease.
"(c) PAYMENT OF TAx.-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-The tax imposed by this section shall
be paid by the individual on whom the procedure is performed.
"(2) COLLECTION.-Every person receiving a payment for
procedures on which a tax is imposed under subsection (a)
shall collect the amount of the tax from the individual on
whom the procedure is performed and remit such tax quarterly
to the Secretary at such time and in such manner as provided
by the Secretary.
"(3) SECONDARY LIABILITY.-Where any tax imposed by sub-
section ( a) is not paid at the time payments for cosmetic surgery
and medical procedures are made, then to the extent that
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(C) by striking subclause (III) and inserting the fol-
lowing:
"(III) 73 percent in the case of an eligible
insured whose household income is more than 200
percent but not more than 250 percent of the pov-
erty line for a family of the size involved; and
"(IV) 70 percent in the case of an eligible
insured whose household income is more than 250
percent but not more than 400 percent of the pov-
erty line for a family of the size involved."; and
(2) in paragraph (2)-
(A) in subparagraph (A)-
(i) by striking "90" and inserting "94"; and
(ii) by striking "and";
(B) in subparagraph (B)-
(i) by striking "80" and inserting "87"; and
(ii) by striking the period and inserting "; and";
and
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following
new subparagraph:
"(C) in the case of an eligible insured whose household
income is more than 200 percent but not more than 250
percent of the poverty line for a family of the size involved,
increase the plan's share of the total allowed costs of bene-
fits provided under the plan to 73 percent of such costs.".
SEC. 1002 . INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY.
(a) AMOUNTS.-Section 5000A(c) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 , as added by section 1501 (b) of the Patient Protection
Ante, p . 244, 907 , and Affordable Care Act and amended by section 10106 of such
Act, is amended-
(1) in paragraph (2)(B)-
(A) in the matter preceding clause (i), by-
(i) inserting "the excess of before "the taxpayer's
household income"; and
(ii) inserting "for the taxable year over the amount
of gross income specified in section 6012(a)(1) with
respect to the taxpayer " before "for the taxable year";
(B) in clause (i), by striking "0.5" and inserting "1.0";
(C) in clause (ii), by striking " 1.0" and inserting "2.0";
and
(D) in clause (iii), by striking "2.0" and inserting "2.5";
and
(2) in paragraph (3)-
(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking "$750" and
inserting "$695";
(B) in subparagraph (B), by striking "$495" and
inserting "$325"; and
(C) in subparagraph (D)-
(i) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking
"$750" and inserting "$695"; and
(ii) in clause (i), by striking "$750" and inserting
"$695".
(b) THRESHOLD.-Section 5000A of such Code, as so added
and amended, is amended-
(1) by striking subsection (c)(4)(D); and
(2) in subsection (e)(2)-
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(A) by striking "UNDER 100 PERCENT OF POVERTY LINE"
and inserting "BELOW FILING THRESHOLD"; and
(B) by striking all that follows "less than" and inserting
"the amount of gross income specified in section 6012(a)(1)
with respect to the taxpayer.".
SEC. 1003 . EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY.
(a) PAYMENT CALCULATION.-Subparagraph (D) of subsection
(d)(2) of section 498011 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
as added by section 1513 of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act and amended by section 10106 of such Act, is amended Ante, p. 253, 907.
to read as follows:
"(D) APPLICATION OF EMPLOYER SIZE TO ASSESSABLE
PENALTIES.-
"(i) IN GENERAL.-The number of individuals
employed by an applicable large employer as full-time
employees during any month shall be reduced by 30
solely for purposes of calculating-
"(I) the assessable payment under subsection
(a), or
"(II) the overall limitation under subsection
(b)(2).
"(ii) AGGREGATION.-In the case of persons treated
as 1 employer under subparagraph (C)(i), only 1 reduc-
tion under subclause (I) or (II) shall be allowed with
respect to such persons and such reduction shall be
allocated among such persons ratably on the basis
of the number of full-time employees employed by each
such person.".
(b) APPLICABLE PAYMENT AMOUNT.-Section 4980H of such
Code, as so added and amended, is amended-
(1) in the flush text following subsection (c)(1)(B), by
striking "400 percent of the applicable payment amount" and
inserting "an amount equal to 1/12 of $3,000";
(2) in subsection (d)(1), by striking "$ 750" and inserting
"$2,000"; and
(3) in subsection (d)(5)(A), in the matter preceding clause
(i), by striking " subsection (b)(2) and (d)(1)" and inserting "sub-
section (b) and paragraph (1)".
(c) COUNTING PART-TIME WORKERS IN SETTING THE THRESHOLD
FOR EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY .--Section 4980H(d)(2) of such Code,
as so added and amended and as amended by subsection (a), is
amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
"(E) FULL-TIME EQUIVALENTS TREATED AS FULL-TIME
EMPLOYEES.-Solely for purposes of determining whether
an employer is an applicable large employer under this
paragraph , an employer shall, in addition to the number
of full-time employees for any month otherwise determined,
include for such month a number of full-time employees
determined by dividing the aggregate number of hours
of service of employees who are not full -time employees
for the month by 120.".
(d) ELIMINATING WAITING PERIOD ASSESSMENT .-Section 4980H
of such Code, as so added and amended and as amended by the
preceding subsections, is amended by striking subsection (b) and
redesignating subsections (c), (d), and (e) as subsections (b), (c),
and (d), respectively.
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SEC. 1004 . INCOME DEFINITIONS.
(a) MODIFIED ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-The following provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 are each amended by striking "modified
gross" each place it appears and inserting "modified adjusted
gross":
(A) Clauses (i) and (ii) of section 36B(d)(2)(A), as added
by section 1401 of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Ante, p. 213. Care Act.
(B) Section 6103(1)(21)(A)(iv ), as added by section 1414
Ante, p . 236, of such Act.
(C) Clauses (i) and (ii) of section 5000A(c)(4), as added
Ante, p . 244. by section 1501 (b) of such Act.
(2) DEFINITION.-
(A) Section 36B(d)(2)(B) of such Code, as so added,
is amended to read as follows:
"(B) MODIFIED ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME.-The term
`modified adjusted gross income' means adjusted gross
income increased by-
"(i) any amount excluded from gross income under
section 911, and
"(ii) any amount of interest received or accrued
by the taxpayer during the taxable year which is
exempt from tax.".
(B) Section 5000A(c)(4)(C) of such Code, as so added,
is amended to read as follows:
"(C) MODIFIED ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME.-The term
`modified adjusted gross income' means adjusted gross
income increased by-
"(i) any amount excluded from gross income under
section 911, and
"(ii) any amount of interest received or accrued
by the taxpayer during the taxable year which is
exempt from tax.".
(b) MODIFIED ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME DEFINITION.-
(1) MEDICAID .-Section 1902 of the Social Security Act
(42 U.S . C. 1396a) is amended by striking "modified gross
income" each place it appears in the text and headings of
the following provisions and inserting "modified adjusted gross
income":
(A) Paragraph ( 14) of subsection (e), as added by sec-
tion 2002(a) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act.
(B) Subsection (gg)(4)(A), as added by section 2001(b)
of such Act.
(2) CHIP.-
(A) STATE PLAN REQUIREMENTS .-Section
2102(b)(1)(B)(v) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
1397bb (b)(1)(B)(v )), as added by section 2101 (d)(1) of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, is amended
by striking "modified gross income " and inserting "modified
adjusted gross income".
(B) PLAN ADMINISTRATION.-Section 2107(e)(1)(E) of the.
Social Security Act (42 U. S.C. 1397gg(e)(1)(E)), as added
by section 2101 (d)(2) of the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act, is amended by striking "modified gross
income" and inserting "modified adjusted gross income".
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